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THE SECRET'S OUT: CALIFORNIA'S ADOPTION OF
THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT-
EFFECTS ON THE EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of a "trade secret" is a common law development
designed to prevent the unjust misappropriation of a business person's
commercially valuable interest.1 Virtually any commercial information
is a potential trade secret, and given the broad range of data covered by
trade secrets, the criteria for determining which interests deserve protec-
tion are critical. Yet, despite the increasing importance of trade secrets,2
1. For a comprehensive study on trade secrets law, see generally R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM
ON TRADE SECRETS (1984).
For a practical guide on California trade secret law, see generally ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO
TRADE SECRETS (C. Brosnahan ed. 1971) (Cal. Continuing Educ. of the Bar); BROWN &
ZELIN, Trade Secrets, in ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF COMPETITIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES (A. Browne ed. 1981) (Cal. Continuing Educ. of the Bar).
2. Protecting valuable, commercial interests as trade secrets instead of as patents, for
example, has several advantages. Unlike patents and copyrights, trade secrets are protected
indefinitely and do not have to be fully disclosed to the public in exchange for protection.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment a at 4, 5 & comment b at 6, 7 (1939). Additionally,
trade secret protection is preferred because trade secrets are less likely to be exposed than are
patents and copyrights:
A valid patent provides a legal monopoly for seventeen years in exchange for
public disclosure of an invention. If, however, the courts ultimately decide that the
Patent Office improperly issued a patent, an invention will have been disclosed to
competitors with no corresponding benefit. In view of the substantial number of
patents that are invalidated by the courts, many businesses now elect to protect com-
mercially valuable information through reliance upon the state law of trade secret
protection.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AT commissioners' prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980). The Com-
missioners' summary was repeated by Assemblyman Elihu Harris, author of Assembly Bill
501, introducing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in California, in his letter to Governor George
Deukmejian urging the Governor's signature on A.B. 501. Letter from Elihu Harris to Gover-
nor George Deukmejian (Sept. 12, 1984) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
Today's need for greater trade secret regulation is necessary due to the increasing tempta-
tion to misappropriate trade secrets rather than do costly research and development. In our
advanced society, knowledge of a program, method, technique or device in highly technical
industries like electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals is a valuable asset subject to indus-
trial spying. Companies are often more willing to use improper means or engage in espionage
to gain access to secret information than to spend the time or money to research and develop
the information themselves. Thus, when a company does spend substantial money for research
and development, some degree of protection to guard against the misuse and abuse of new
developments is necessary. Since markets for trade secret misappropriation are increasing,
more effective control of trade secrets (e.g. through the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (codified at
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courts in the past have been hesitant to limit trade secrets by definition or
clearly define the scope of protection available.3 As a result, a plethora of
loosely connected principles with no precise rules developed.4
Early California courts had little guidance to aid them in determin-
ing which commercial interests constituted trade secrets and warranted
protection. Generally, those c6urts viewed trade secrets as the em-
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.10 (West Supp. 1985)) is necessary. Hofer, Business Warfare
over Trade Secrets, 9 LITGATION 8 (1983). See generally J. SuTTON, Developments and
Trends in Trade Secrets Law, in ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO TRADE SECRETS 2, 3 (C. Brosnahan
ed. 1971) (Cal. Continuing Educ. of the Bar) for a discussion on the increasing importance of
trade secrets.
3. Various commentators and authorities have concluded that the law of trade secrets is
widely misunderstood and requires clarification. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT commission-
ers' prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980) ("[E]ven in states in which there has been significant
[trade secret] litigation, there is undue uncertainty concerning the parameters of trade secret
protection, and the appropriate remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret."); BROWN &
ZELIN, supra note 1, at 109 ("Despite the evolution of statutory and case law in the area, trade
secrets remain, perhaps due to their evanescent nature, the most misunderstood of all the
intangible and protectible commercial interests."); Comment, A Balanced Approach to Em-
ployer-Employee Trade Secrets Disputes in California, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 671, 671 (1980) ("The
concept of a trade secret is an elusive one at best.").
4. Specifically, in California, trade secret law blended contract and property principles
and was later modified by the 1939 Restatement of Torts, (Restatement) regulated by a variety
of statutes, and interpreted by the judiciary. For example, trade secret actions could be initi-
ated under provisions of the Restatement § 757 which imposes liability for the disclosure or
use of another's trade secret. See RESTATMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). Contract theories for
breach of confidence might also be alleged. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment j at
13 (1939) (establishing common law liability for breach of a confidential relationship based on
agency principles); 4 CAL. ANNOTS. TO THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 757
comment a at 7-8 (1959) (annotating California trade secret cases which turn on breach of
trust and confidence). Trade secret cause of actions are sometimes couched on property theo-
ries. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 2860 (West 1971) which provides that "[e]verything which an
employee acquires by virtue of his employment.., belongs to the employer, whether acquired
lawfully or unlawfully, or during or after the expiration of the term of his employment." See
also 4 CAL. ANNOTS. TO THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 757 comment a at 7-9
(1959) (annotating California cases which apply the above Labor Code provision and quasi-
property theory). Unfair competition or unfair practices theories are viable under California
Business and Professions Code § 16600 (governing the law of unfair competition). See, e.g.,
Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985); Gordon Termite
Control v. Terrones, 84 Cal. App. 3d 176, 148 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1978); Tennant Co. v. Advance
Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1984) (applying California law). And, finally, criminal
liability may attach when trade secrets are missappropriated under California Penal Code
§ 499c (providing criminal liability for the theft of scientific or technical trade secrets). See,
e-g., People v. Gopal, 171 Cal. App. 3d 524, 217 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1985) (theft of trade secrets
from Silicon Valley firms manufacturing semiconductors and computer chip devices); People
v. Serrata, 62 Cal. App. 3d 9, 133 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976) (theft of a trade secret from a com-
puter corporation).
In response to this fragment of codes, caselaw and theories, one commentator summa-
rized the confusing state of trade secrets as "a collection of judges' opinions on what is fair in
the commercial world. In this melange of case law almost any abstract proposition can find
support." Pooley, Better Protection for Trade Secrets, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1985, at 51, 51.
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ployer's property, but protected only those interests which clearly be-
longed to the employer, were entrusted to the employee in confidence,
and were later misappropriated by the employee.' Better guidelines for
trade secret protection came in 1939 with the adoption of section 757 of
the Restatement of Torts (Restatement), but the Restatement was still
inadequate. 6 Like most states, California has relied heavily on the princi-
ples set out in section 757. However, although section 757 was the most
widely accepted rule governing liability for trade secret misappropria-
tion,7 it failed to provide uniform or satisfactory guidelines to resolve
trade secret conflicts in the employer-employee context. Three limita-
tions of section 757 of the Restatement are generally recognized today.
First, the practicality of the Restatement is questionable. The prin-
ciples and illustrations in section 757 of the Restatement are derived
from cases decided before 1939. Because of its antiquated nature, the
Restatement may not be the best authority to govern trade secret litiga-
tion. The Restatement's authors could not possibly have envisioned the
technical changes and industrial developments affecting trade secret law
today,8 yet section 757 of the 1939 Restatement has not been updated.9
5. For cases discussing trade secrets before the 1939 Restatement became effective, see
Dairy Dale Co. v. Azevedo, 211 Cal. 344, 295 P. 10 (1931) (per curiam); Pasadena Ice Co. v.
Reeder, 206 Cal. 697, 275 P. 944 (1929); Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 130 P.
1180 (1913).
6. For instance, although the Restatement provided general examples of trade secrets, the
comments to § 757 stated that "[a]n exact definition of a trade secret is not possible" and
further declared that "[a] complete catalogue of improper means [for trade secret misappropri-
ation] is not possible." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b at 6 & comment f at 11
(1939).
7. See R. MILGRIM, 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01, at 2-3 (1984); Robison, The
Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law about Trade Secrets, 25 ARIz. L. REv. 347, 347
n.3 (1983); Gilbune & Johnston, Computer Software Protection Available in Trade Secret Law,
Legal Times, Nov. 22, 1982, at 16, col. 3.
In California, courts generally applied the principles of § 757 to determine if a protectable
trade secret existed. Review of Selected 1984 California Legislation, 16 PAC. L.J. 461, 732 n.1 1
(1985). See also Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 288-89, 23 Cal. Rptr.
198, 211 (1962) ("[I]t is evident that California has adopted the broad approach set forth in
Restatement, Torts, volume 4, section 757 ... ").
8. For a similar view suggesting the inadequacy of the Restatement to govern modem
day trade secrets, see Comment, Balancing Employers' Trade Secret Interests in High-Technol-
ogy Products Against Employees' Rights and Public Interests in Minnesota, 69 MINN. L. REv.
984 (1985) [hereinafter Balancing Interests] which provides:
The decades following the Restatement's adoption have seen not only a transfor-
mation in products needing protection but also a transformation in employment rela-
tionships. Courts relying on the Restatement may not fully realize that "modem
economic growth and development has pushed the business venture beyond the size
of the [one-person] firm, forcing the [business person] to a much greater degree to
entrust confidential business information relating to technological development to
appropriate employees." Successful development of a high technology product, in
particular, often depends on the expertise of several employees, thus increasing the
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Second, the Restatement is incomplete. While it provides general guide-
lines for trade secret misappropriation, section 757 is acutely void of im-
portant definitions relating to trade secrets.10 Thus, while some areas of
trade secrets are regulated, section 757 fails to treat other areas and is not
uniformly applied. Finally, section 757, alone, is meaningless and must
be read in conjunction with its comments in order to be understood com-
pletely." Unfortunately, courts exercise great discretion in interpreting
and dissecting the Restatement and freely adopt or reject section 757 and
its comments in whole or in part. 2 Because there is no guarantee that
possibility of trade secret appropriation. This possibility is heightened by the increas-
ing mobility of the modem labor force. To ensure continuity when one employee
leaves the firm, the employer must confide trade secret information to additional
employees. Today's employers, therefore, require greater trade secret protection
than did their 1939 counterparts.
Id. at 991.
For example, the increasing importance of computer technology is illustrated in Jostens,
Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982): "[I]t is estimated that some
15,000 computer programs are written each day in this country and that the total value of this
software is in the tens of billions of dollars." Id. at 694 n. 1 (citing Schmidt, Legal Proprietary
Interests in Computer Programs: The American Experience, 21 JURIMETRICS J. 345 (1981)),
See also Comment, All the King's Horses-Irreparable Harm in Trade Secret Litigation, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 804 (1984) (discussing the explosive technological growth in the computer,
biotechnology and communications industries).
9. In fact, because of § 757's antiquity and the inevitable changes in trade secrets and
technology, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts deliberately omitted § 757 in
1979. They concluded that:
The rules relating to liability for harm caused by unfair trade practices [such as
§ 757] developed doctrinally from established principles in the law of Torts, and for
this reason the decision was made that it was appropriate to include these legal areas
in the Restatement of Torts, despite the fact that the fields of Unfair Competition and
Trade Regulation were rapidly developing into independent bodies of law with di-
minishing reliance upon the traditional principles of Tort law. In the more than 40
years since that decision was initially made, the influence of Tort law has continued
to decrease, so that it is now largely of historical interest and the law of Unfair Com-
petition and Trade Regulation is no more dependent upon Tort law than it is on
many other general fields of the law and upon broad statutory developments, particu-
larly at the federal level. The Council formally reached the decision that these chap-
ters no longer belong in the Restatement of Torts, and they are omitted from this
Second Restatement. If it should be later decided that the law on these subjects
ought to be restated, it will be done by separate restatements on the subjects involved.
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 1-2 (1979).
10. Guidelines regulating pleadings, discovery procedures, damages, attorney's fees and
the statute of limitations, for example, are visibly absent from § 757 of the Restatement. Con-
founded litigants must turn to additional statutory and case law for answers to the obvious
gaps and interface the fragmented sources together.
11. For example, while the rules explaining what constitutes a misappropriation of a trade
secret are clearly set forth in the text of § 757, the principles governing the requisite elements
of a trade secret are found amid the comments. As a result, the comments, which normally
function as a supplement to the rules, must be read in conjunction with the text and should be
(however, in reality, are rarely) treated just as importantly as the rules themselves. Balancing
Interests, supra note 8, at 989.
12. For example, Georgia does not fully embrace the principles of § 757 of the Restate-
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the Restatement will be evenly applied, trade secret litigants have no reli-
able way to measure when liability will be imposed.
In response to the Restatement's shortcomings, California's timely
adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Uniform Act) brings greater
certainty to California trade secret law.13 The California Act corrects
the deficiencies of the Restatement by providing precise and clear guide-
lines for determining when trade secret liability exists in the employer-
employee context. The statute is also comprehensive. It begins by defin-
ing trade secrets 4 and other terms relating to trade secrets. 5 Further,
ment. Georgia courts distinguish "trade secrets" from "confidential information," although
the former encompasses the latter in the Restatement. Additionally, Georgia courts require
"trade secrets" to display attributes of novelty, a factor not required in the Restatement.
Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information under Georgia Law, 19 GA. L. REV.
623, 624-25 (1985). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b at 6-7 (1939) ("Nov-
elty and invention are not requisite for a trade secret as they are for patentability. These
requirements are essential to patentability because a patent protects against unlicensed use of
the patented device or process .... But such is not the case with a trade secret.").
13. The Uniform Act became effective in California on January 1, 1985. California is the
ninth state to adopt the Uniform Act, and its version is found in new California Civil Code
§§ 3426-3426.10. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.10 (West Supp. 1985). Additionally, the
California Legislature enacted California Code of Civil Procedure § 2036.2 as part of the Cali-
fornia Act to instrnct plaintiffs how to plead a cause of action for trade secret misappropriation
under the new statute. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2036.2 (West Supp. 1985).
Eight other states have adopted the Uniform Act. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50
to 35-58 (West Supp. 1985) (approved June 23, 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009
(Supp. 1984) (effective Apr. 15, 1982); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to 24-2-3-8 (Burns Supp.
1985) (approved Feb. 25, 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to 60-3330 (1983); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431-51:1439 (West Supp. 1986) (approved July 19, 1981); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 325C.01-325C.08 (West 1981) (effective Jan. 1, 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-
01 to 47-25.1-08 (Supp. 1985) (effective July 1, 1983); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010-
19.108.940 (Supp. 1986) (effective Jan. 1, 1982).
Arkansas and Idaho have also adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 70-1001 to 70-1007 (Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to 48-807 (Supp. 1986).
However, because these statutes are not identified as the Uniform Act, they were not included
in the Uniform Law Annotated volume. See R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS app.
AA at AA-2 (1985); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 278 (West Supp. 1985).
In addition, North Carolina enacted the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act
which was modeled after the Uniform Trade Secret Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to
66-157 (Supp. 1983) (effective Oct. 1, 1981); Root & Blynn, Abandonment of Common-Law
Principles: The North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823
(1982). However, because there are significant differences between the North Carolina Act
and the Uniform Act, North Carolina was not included in the Uniform Laws Annotated vol-
ume. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 278 (West Supp. 1985).
14. The statute defines trade secrets as "information, including a formula, pattern, compi-
lation, program, device, method, technique, or process" that derives actual or potential value
from not being generally known and is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1985).
15. The California Act defines terms, within the meaning of the statute, involved in trade
secret law such as "improper means," "misappropriation" and "person." Id. § 3426.1.
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the statute identifies remedies available 6 and includes procedural rules
governing pleading 7 and discovery.' 8 Generally, any business informa-
tion that meets the California Act's definition of a trade secret and is
misappropriated within the meaning of the statute is entitled to court
protection.
Trade secret litigation affects the employer-employee relationship
where an employer possesses some information (e.g., a customer list, a
manufacturing process or a special formula) which he discloses in confi-
dence to his employee during the course of business.' 9 Litigation often
develops when the worker leaves his employment and uses his former
employer's trade secret for his own advantage or for his new employer,
usually a competing firm. When this occurs, the former employer no
longer controls his trade secret, and his competitive advantage derived
from the secret is lost.20 The employer usually seeks relief from the court
which must consider the circumstances and decide whether or not to
enjoin the employee from using the information. Because an overwhelm-
ing number of trade secret cases involve employer-employee scenarios,
this Comment is tailored to trade secret issues in this area.
This Comment discusses how California's adoption of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act will codify existing law in some areas of the employer-
employee relationship while expanding trade secret protection into new
areas. First, the history of trade secret litigation in California, as devel-
oped under the Restatement, will be examined. The statutory and case
law governing trade secret litigation before the enactment of the 1985
statute will be surveyed, and the general policies behind the statutory and
case law will also be discussed. It will examine the California courts'
treatment of a specific trade secret, customer lists. Second, the California
Act will be analyzed and contrasted with the Restatement. This section
will provide a comprehensive look at the provisions of the California Act,
16. Id. §§ 3426.2, 3426.3.
17. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2036.2 (West Supp. 1985).
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.5.
19. See, e.g., Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 398, 403, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 268, 272 (1961) ("It is so well established as to need no extensive citations of authorities
that a former employee may not use trade secrets learned through his employer to that em-
ployer's disadvantage."); Riess v. Sanford, 47 Cal. App. 2d 244, 246, 117 P.2d 694, 695 (1941)
("[Tihe accepted doctrine is that no agent or employee having been intrusted in the course of
his employment with secret and valuable information known only to his employer may thereaf-
ter utilize this secret knowledge against the interests or to the prejudice of his employer.").
20. See, e.g., Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d 690, 321 P.2d 456 (1958) (customer list, a
trade secret, held to be an asset to the business and fundamental to the business' success and
survival); Riess v. Sanford, 47 Cal. App. 2d 244, 117 P.2d 694 (manufacturing process of
cactus phonographic needles found only in Arizona, a trade secret, was necessarily a secret to
protect plaintiff's competitive advantage.).
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distinguish the features of the California Act from the Uniform Act, and
illustrate the approach a court should take when faced with a trade secret
cause of action brought under the statute. This Comment concludes that
the greatest benefit of the California Act is the refreshingly simple and
direct tests which must be applied to determine whether or not trade
secret liability exists, but warns that any interpretation of the statute
must be read in line with the policies underlying the Uniform Act in
order to achieve a fair and equitable result for both the employer and
employee.
II. HISTORY OF TRADE SECRET LAW IN CALIFORNIA
A. Trade Secret Development Under the Restatement
Before California's adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
courts overwhelmingly applied the Restatement of Torts section 757 to
find civil liability for trade secret misappropriations.2 1 The text of sec-
tion 757, in full, provides:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a
privilege to do so, is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the
secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use consti-
tutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in dis-
closing the secret to him, or (c) he learned the secret from a
third person with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that
the third person discovered it by improper means or that the
third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his
duty to the other, or (d) he learned the secret with notice of the
facts that it was a secret and that its disclosure was made to
him by mistake.2"
Comment b to section 757 also provides that a "trade secret may consist
of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."23 That com-
ment further states that "[t]he subject matter of a trade secret must be
secret. Matters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an indus-
try cannot be appropriated by one as his secret."24 Hence, under the
Restatement, a defendant was generally liable if two conditions were met:
(a) the commercial interest was a protectable trade secret, and (b) the
21. See supra note 7.
22. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
23. Id. § 757 comment b at 5 (1939).
24. Id. comment b at 5-6.
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defendant knew the interest was a trade secret and the misappropriation
involved the disclosure or use of that secret.
1. Definitions: Defining a protectable trade secret and determining
misappropriation
a. defining a protectable trade secret
Although the Restatement admits that "[a]n exact definition of a
trade secret is not possible," 5 comment b of section 757 lists various
examples of commercial interest that typically constitute trade secrets.2 6
Even if a particular commercial interest was listed in the Restatement,
that interest was not necessarily a protectable trade secret within the
scope of the Restatement. In considering whether the commercial inter-
est was a protectable trade secret, several requirements had to be met.
First, the trade secret had to be in "continuous use" in the business.
2 7
Under this requirement, an employer had to be actively using the infor-
mation at the time of the misappropriation or a court would not enjoin
an employee from subsequently using that secret. 21 Second, the em-
25. Id. comment b at 6.
26. Comment b of § 757 suggests that a formula for a chemical compound; a process for
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials; a pattern for a machine or device; or a cus-
tomer list are typical trade secrets. The comment further suggests that a trade secret can be
something involved in the production of goods (e.g., a machine or formula for producing
goods) or in the sale of goods (e.g., a code for determining discounts, rebates, or other conces-
sions in a price list; a catalogue; a specialized customer list; or a method of bookkeeping or
office management). Id. comment b at 5.
Additionally, although comment b states that no exact definition of a trade secret is possi-
ble, see supra text accompanying note 25, the Restatement provides factors a court may look at
to determine the existence of a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the
extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the
extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the
value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b at 6 (1939).
27. Comment b of § 757 further explains, using examples, what is meant by "continuous
use":
[A trade secret under § 757] differs from other secret information in a business.., in
that it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the
business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract, or
the salary of certain employees, or the security investments made or contemplated, or
the date fixed for the announcement of a new policy or for bringing out a new model
or the like. A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of
the business.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
28. California courts have strictly upheld the continuous use requirement in deciding
whether a protectable trade secret exists. For example, in Cal Francisco Inv. Corp. v. Vrionis,
14 Cal. App. 3d 318, 92 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1971), an employee used his employer's real estate
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ployer had to gain a competitive advantage from his ownership of the
trade secret.29 Although the owner was forbidden from possessing a mo-
nopoly over his trade secret,30 the Restatement required that he reap
some benefit from the secret that other competitors in the same industry
lacked.31
A trade secret must also be kept a secret.32 Secrecy is the key ele-
listing to conduct a sale after leaving the employer. The court held that the real estate listing
was not a trade secret because the listing, although a secret commercial interest, was a separate
and "distinct transaction." Id. at 323, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 205. In addition to holding that the
continuous use requirement was not met, the court weighed heavily the public policy favoring
an individual's right to pursue his professional calling and dismissed the plaintiff's case for
failure to state an adequate cause of action. Id
29. See R=ATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b at 5 (1939); BROWN & ZELIN, supra
note 1, at 111.
30. See Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 283, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198,
207 (1962) ("[O]wnership of a trade secret does not give the owner a monopoly on its use, but
merely a proprietary right which equity protects against usurpation by unfair means.").
One of the distinctions between patent protection and trade secret protection is that a
person obtains a legal monopoly over his commercial interest with a patent but not with trade
secret protection. The differing purposes of patent and trade secret protection explains this
distinction. According to comment b of § 757 of the Restatement, a patent rewards the owner
for his interest by giving him a monopoly over his property. In contrast, the goal of trade
secret protection is not to reward the possessor for his secret but to punish the party who
unjustly misappropriates the secret.
Also, because several people can potentially own the same trade secret, it is impossible for
a single owner to claim a monopoly of a trade secret. For example, an owner of a trade secret
(party "A") can give another party (party "B") permission to use A's trade secret in B's busi-
ness. Since B was given permission to use A's secret, he has not misappropriated A's trade
secret and would not be subject to trade secret liability. Both A and B would be valid owners
of the same trade secret, and both would be entitled to judicial protection of the information.
Another example of potential multi-ownership of a trade secret would be if B purchased A's
product on the open market and by reverse engineering (the process whereby one takes apart
and examines a publicly available process to understand its secrets), learns of A's secret and
uses the secret in his (Bs) business. Since reverse engineering is not an "improper means" of
misappropriating a trade secret under § 757(a), B would become a legitimate owner of the
trade secret. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment a at 4 (1939) (stating that there is
no liability for proper discovery of a trade secret and indicating that inspection of a commer-
cially available product to determine its secret would not be improper); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3426.1(a) (West Supp. 1985) (California Act specifically exempts reverse engineering from
"improper means."). Thus, A and B would both possess the same trade secret, neither would
have a monopoly, and both would be legitimate owners of the secret and entitled to court
protection under § 757.
31. The Restatement requires the possessor of a trade secret to "obtain an advantage [from
the trade secret] over competitors who do not know or use it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757 comment b at 5 (1939).
32. An essential element of a trade secret is its secrecy. See Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid
Ungar Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 399, 403, 13 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271 (1961) ("The character of the
secrets, if peculiar and important to the business, is not material; but it must, as the term
implies, be kept secret by the one who creates it."); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape
Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 166, 329 P.2d 147, 152 (1958) ("The character of the secret if
important to the business is not material but it must, as the term implies, be kept secret by the
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ment of a trade secret, and whether or not the employer successfully ex-
ercised his duty to preserve its secrecy has been litigated repeatedly.33 If
an alleged trade secret was easily ascertainable or known in the industry,
then the trade secret was not really a "secret," and courts would not
protect that commercial interest.34 Furthermore, the possessor of the
trade secret had the burden to demonstrate he took adequate steps to
preserve the secrecy of his commercial interest before he could obtain
judicial relief.35 If he failed to meet this burden, trade secret protection
was not granted.
b. determining misappropriation
The second condition for imposing liability under the Restatement
was met if the employee misappropriated the trade secret one of four
ways. The employee could be liable if he used or disclosed the trade
secret after discovering the secret by improper means.36 He could be
liable if he used or disclosed the trade secret after the secret was revealed
to him in confidence.37 Also, a person could misappropriate a trade se-
cret if he learned of the trade secret, with notice that it was a secret, from
one who claims it."); California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 203,
188 P.2d 303, 306 (1948) ("The fundamental difference in the decisions, as we read them, is
whether in a given case the knowledge gained by an employee is secret and confidential.").
33. See, e.g., Ungar Elea Tools, 192 Cal. App. 2d at 400-01, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 270 (trade
secret established because plaintiff had "taken reasonable precautions to preserve information
concerning the ingredients used in its products... and had taken such reasonable precautions
to preserve its technique and process of manufacturing and assembling as secret and
confidential").
34. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b at 5-6 (1939). "Matters of public knowl-
edge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret.
Matters which are completely disclosed by the goods which one markets cannot be his secret."
Id. See also Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 (1952) (plain-
tiff's customers were not preferred customers, and their identities were easily ascertainable by
the public).
35. See supra note 33. In addition, one of the factors in determining whether or not a
protectable trade secret exists includes "the extent of measures taken by him [the trade secret
holder] to guard the secrecy of the information." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b
at 6 (1939).
36. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(a) (1939).
Although the comment to the Restatement concludes that "[a] complete catalogue of
improper means is not possible," Id. § 757 comment f at 11 (1939), the comment provides
excellent examples of what would constitute "improper means" under § 757(a). For example,
a person who "uses physical force to take a secret formula from another's pocket, or breaks
into another's office to steal the formula ... [or makes] fraudulent misrepresentations to in-
duce disclosure, tapping of telephone wires, eavesdropping or other espionage" to gain a trade
secret, has used "improper means" within the meaning of § 757(a) and is subject to liability.
Id. at 10-11; see also 4 CAL. ANNOTS. TO THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 757
comment f at 16 (1959) (annotating California cases which deal with "improper means").
37. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(b) (1939); see infra notes 41-45.
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a third party who either used improper means to gain the secret or
breached a confidence reposed in him." And, finally, a person could be
liable if he used or disclosed a trade secret which was mistakenly revealed
to him, and he had notice of its secrecy.39
In the employer-employee context, the second type of misappropria-
tion, misappropriation caused by a breach of confidence, is the most
common.' Once hired, all employees have an implied duty to maintain
the confidentiality of any trade secret entrusted to them by their employ-
ers.4 A misappropriation under section 757 occurred when an employee
used or disclosed the secret, thus breaching his duty of confidentiality.42
However, the Restatement only faulted the employee if the employee had
explicit or implicit notice of the confidential characteristic of the
information.43
To protect their trade secrets, employers have included restrictive
covenants in employer-employee agreements to illustrate the confidential
38. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(c) (1939).
To be liable under § 757(c) there are two notice requirements imposed on the defendant.
The defendant must have notice of the secrecy of the information and notice of the third
party's wrongful conduct. Id. § 757 comment m at 16. Additionally, the defendant will be
liable only if he had notice of the secrecy and of the third party's wrongful conduct when, not
after, he first learned of the secret. Id. § 757 comment k at 14.
Regarding notice, the standard that the defendant will be held to is whether a "reasonable
man would be put on inquiry and an inquiry pursued with reasonable intelligence and dili-
gence would disclose the facts." Id. § 757 comment 1 at 15.
39. Id. § 757(d). Thus, the innocent, good faith acquirer of a trade secret, who mistakenly
discovers a trade secret without notice of its secrecy, will not be held liable under the Restate-
ment. However, if the mistaken acquirer later discovers that he possesses a trade secret, he has
a good faith duty not to take advantage of the mistake and must not disclose or use the trade
secret. Id. § 757 comment o at 17.
40. See 4 CAL. ANNOTS. TO THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 757 comment
a at 8-9 & comment j at 17 (1959) for an extensive list of California cases which turn on the
breach of trust and confidence theory.
While the first type of misappropriation, misappropriation by improper means, can take
place in the employer-employee context, its emphasis is on the illegal means used to misappro-
priate the trade secret. It does not necessarily deal with our typical scenario in the employer-
employee context where the employee leaves his place of employment and uses his former
employer's trade secret in breach of a duty of confidence imposed on him through his employ-
ment. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Of course, a defendant can be liable for both
types of misappropriations if the employee used improper means in breaching his duty of confi-
dentiality.
The third and fourth types of misappropriation, § 757(c) and § 757(d), do not usually
take place in the employer-employee context. These impose liability on a third party who
mistakenly acquires the trade secret or who obtains a trade secretfrom an employee who mis-
appropriates the information. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(c), (d) (1939).
41. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
42. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment j at 13-14 (1939).
43. Id. at 14.
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nature of the information they wish to protect. These agreements are
often presented to the employee soon after he starts work and may con-
tain covenants not to compete as well as covenants not to disclose any
information the employee gains during the course of his employment.
Regarding the latter, California courts have generally held that cove-
nants not to disclose valid trade secrets are neither unlawful restraints on
trade nor a violation of California Business and Professions Code section
16600' to the extent they are reasonable4 5 and protect only legitimate
trade secrets.46
A covenant not to disclose trade secrets in any employer-employee
agreement is a common method of showing that the employee had ex-
plicit notice of the existence and confidential nature of a trade secret.
47
However, even if no agreement is made, California courts have held that
an employee is still obligated not to reveal trade secrets.48 As noted by
44. California Business and Professions Code § 16600, generally governing covenants not
to compete, provides that: "Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which any-
one is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that
extent void." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964).
California courts distinguish covenants not to disclose information (such as trade secrets)
from covenants not to compete. While the latter are regulated by § 16600 because they are
viewed as a restriction on competition itself, California courts have not included the former in
this interpretation. See Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d 690, 694, 321 P.2d 456, 459 (1958)
(parties' contract that the defendant would not solicit former customers did not violate
§ 16600); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Dempster, 174 Cal. App. 2d 418, 425, 344 P.2d 821,
825 (1959) (§ 16600 does not apply to trade secrets); Ingrassia v. Bailey, 172 Cal. App. 2d 117,
124, 341 P.2d 370, 375 (1959) (contract not to solicit is distinguishable from a contract Aot to
compete, the latter of which is prohibited by § 16600); By-Buk, 163 Cal. App. 2d at 164, 329
P.2d at 151 (agreement not to disclose trade secret "is not an unlawful restraint of trade unless
it is more extensive than is reasonably required to protect the master's interests").
45. A typical issue concerning the reasonableness of covenants not to disclose is the scope
of the contract. If the agreement is so encompassing or broad, it may be viewed as a restraint
on competition and arguably a violation of Business and Professions Code § 16600. Also,
since the parties cannot contract something that is not a trade secret, see infra note 46, the
courts will not uphold an empty agreement. In contrast, if the scope of the contract is too
limited, the employer may not fare any better since a narrow agreement may preclude protec-
tion for legitimate trade secrets that fall outside the express terms of the agreement.
Courts are at liberty to impose equitable priniciples to correct contractual defects. If the
contract is too broad, the court may reasonably narrow the agreement and extend protection
only to the legitimate trade secrets in question. If the contract is too narrow, courts can still
find an implied confidential relationship outside the contract and hold the employee liable. In
either case, litigating parties are subject to the court's discretion in interpreting the contract
and applying these equitable doctrines. BROWN & ZELIN, supra note 1, at 139.
46. In examining these restrictive covenants, courts clearly require that a legitimate trade
secret exist-"parties remain unable to stipulate by contract that something is a trade secret
when in fact it is not." Pooley, supra note 4, at 53; see State Farm, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 426,
344 P.2d at 825 (contract does not create a trade secret where none exists).
47. See BROWN & ZELIN, supra note 1, at 136-37.
48. See By-Buk, 163 Cal. App. 2d at 164, 329 P.2d at 151 (where court held that "'an
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the court in By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., "an express neg-
ative covenant not to make use of trade secrets or processes is not indis-
pensible to the granting of the relief."49 The By-Buk court further
concluded that "[e]very employee is under the implied obligation not to
divulge or use confidential information which he acquires by reason of
his employment."5 Similarly, the court in Components For Research,
Inc. v. Isolation Products, Inc.II held that even in the absence of an ex-
press agreement, the director had a fiduciary duty not to reveal trade
secrets to his former company's detriment. Thus, in Components, the
court held that the defendant's unlawful disclosure of manufacturing
express negative covenant not to make use of trade secrets or processes is not indispensible to
the granting of the relief' "); Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 130 P. 1180
(1913). In Empire, the court stated: "Equity always protects against the unwarranted disclo-
sure and unconscionable use of trade secrets and confidential business communications." Id
at 99, 130 P. at 1182. The Empire court found that a contract only shows the parties' intent to
create a trade secret, but is not the sole conclusive proof of a trade secret's existence. Compare
Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11, where the court inferred
that without a contract, an injunction barring trade secret disclosure would not be granted if
the employee competes in a fair and legal manner. The facts suggest that the superiority of the
product, not the personal relationship is key, and thus the defendant was not barred from
acquiring former customers in his new business. Id.
This principle, that a contract is not necessary to hold an employee liable where there is a
breach of trust, is also supported in the Restatement.
A breach of confidence under the rule stated in this Clause may also be a breach
of contract which subjects the actor to liability under the rules stated in the Restate-
ment of Contracts. But whether or not there is a breach of contract, the rule stated
in this Section subjects the actor to liability if his disclosure or use of another's trade
secret is a breach of the confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the
secret to him.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment j at 13 (1939) (discussing liability for misappropria-
tion under § 757(b)).
49. 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 164, 329 P.2d 147, 151 (1958).
50. Id. (emphasis added); see also Empire, 165 Cal. at 99, 130 P. at 1182 (customer list of
laundry route, even though partially prepared by defendant, belongs to plaintiff:
"[D]efendant's agency was one of trust and confidence. His duties were to serve well the
customers of plaintiff, to increase the business of the plaintiff, to solicit new business and keep a
complete and confidential list of all the customers."); Futurecraft Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d at
283, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 207-08 (employer must show a legally protected trade secret and legal
basis for relief, i.e., a covenant or a confidential relationship); id. at 285, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09
(confidence limitation--employer must turn over to employee a pre-existing trade secret or else
there may not be misappropriation of a trade secret); id. at 286, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (if no pre-
existing trade secret exists, employer must show that the employment relationship gave rise to
duty of nondisclosure); By-Buk, 163 Cal. App. 2d at 164, 329 P.2d at 151 ("Such information
is the property of the employer and the employee holds that property in trust for the employer
and cannot use it in violation of his trust."); Reiss v. Sanford, 47 Cal. App. 2d 244, 247, 117
P.2d 694, 696 (1941) (" 'The first thing to be made sure of is that the defendant shall not
fraudulently abuse the trust reposed in him.' ") (quoting Dupont de Nemours Powder Co. v.
Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917)).
51. Components for Research, Inc. v. Isolation Prods., Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 727, 729, 50
Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (1966).
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techniques for high electrical energy transmissions warranted money
damages and an injunction. In essence, although a contract is not re-
quired to show proof of notice, the employer and employee frequently
form such an agreement since the existence of a contract strongly sug-
gests that the employer has invested effort to preserve the confidentiality
of his trade secret and that the employee's duty of confidentiality is
clearly known to the employee.
2. Remedies
Assuming that a misappropriation has occurred and a contract gov-
erning the disclosure of a trade secret was formed, a plaintiff could bring
a cause of action for the breach of contract and receive any contractual
remedies available. 2
If no contract was made, or, in addition to the relief for the breach
of contract if a contract was formed, a plaintiff could seek remedies
under section 757 of the Restatement for the misappropriation of the
trade secret. The Restatement provided that the plaintiff could obtain
"appropriate remedies under the circumstances" and suggested four
types of remedies that were available: (1) damages for past harm, (2) in-
junction against future use, (3) accounting for the wrongdoer's profits,
and (4) surrendering the secret to the owner for destruction." Addition-
ally, the Restatement was clear that the plaintiff was not limited to only
one remedy.54
The primary remedy sought by the employer in trade secret cases is
injunctive relief. In determining whether or not an injunction should be
issued, California courts first required that the employer truly have a
protectable trade secret5 5 and then considered the impact the injunction
52. See BROWN & ZELIN, supra note 1, at 143; see also supra note 45 (court may tailor the
remedy to the contract).
53. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment e at 10 (1939).
54. Id. See, e.g., Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 107, 148 P.2d
9, 11 (1944) (plaintiff sought injunction and damages for alleged misappropriation of trade
secret); Futurecraft Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d at 281, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (plaintiff brought
action for unfair competition and sought injunction, damages, and an accounting against a
former employee); Matthews Paint Co. v. Seaside Paint Co., 148 Cal. App. 2d 168, 168, 306
P.2d 113, 114 (1957) (plaintiff sought injunction and accounting of profits).
55. Courts will generally not grant injunctive relief unless the employee misappropriates a
protectable trade secret belonging to the employer. See, e.g., Fidelity v. Federal, 217 Cal. 307,
314, 18 P.2d 950, 953 (1933) ("only where the employee is in the possession of secret informa-
tion not readily accessible to others and acquired by reason of his employment [i.e., a protect-
able trade secret as defined under the Restatement will the courts] afford injunctive relief");
Paraco v. Owens, 166 Cal App. 2d 777, 333 P.2d 360 (1959) (court refused to enjoin former
employee from using employer's customer list since the employer failed to allege facts showing
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would have on the employee.5 6 In issuing an injunction, courts exercised
great discretion in deciding what type of injunction to issue, determining
the length of the injunction, and specifying its scope. The length of the
injunction varied and, depending on the circumstances of the case,
courts could issue a preliminary, temporary, or permanent injunction."
Although a minority of courts in other jurisdictions have been willing to
issue permanent injunctions5 8 barring the defendant from ever using the
information even if the trade secret eventually becomes exposed, Califor-
nia courts have more reasonably limited the injunction to a reasonable
time, measured by the time that a third party would need to legitimately
discover or develop that secret.59 Additionally, if an injunction was too
broad in scope, California courts frequently modified injunctions, limit-
ing them only to the trade secret in question.60
Plaintiffs would often seek damages as well as injunctive relief for a
trade secret misappropriation. Unfortunately, because the Restatement
provided no guidelines regulating damages,61 courts disagreed on the cir-
cumstances in which damages were appropriate, and the amount that
could be awarded to successful plaintiffs. For example, although courts
had the authority to award damages, there were questions raised over the
circumstances when damages could be awarded if coupled with a request
for an injunction.62 Also, the types of damages available were uncertain.
that the list was a secret not generally ascertainable); Matthews Paint Co. v. Seaside Paint Co.,
148 Cal. App. 168, 306 P.2d 113 (same).
56. See Matthews Paint, 148 Cal. App. at 175, 306 P.2d at 117 ("The doctrine under which
injunctive relief is granted should not be given application that would overemphasize the em-
ployer's right to the detriment of the employee by treating as confidential and secret all knowl-
edge and information gained by the employee that might be of assistance to him .... ").
57. See, e.g., Ingrassia v. Bailey, 172 Cal. 2d 117, 341 P.2d 370 (preliminary injunction
sustained enjoining defendant from using plaintiff's trade secret, a catering route list); Ad-
vance Business Tels., Inc. v. Professional Data Processing, Inc. 359 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1984)
(temporary restraining order became permanent restraining order because defendant failed to
show cause).
58. See Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
59. See BRoWN & ZELIN, supra note 1, at 144; Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64
MARQ. L. REv. 277, 302 (1980).
60. See, e.g., Components, 241 Cal. App. 2d at 730-31, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (court injunc-
tion modified to apply only to the method or production of the particular trade secret); Califor-
nia Intelligence Bureau, 83 Cal. App. 2d at 204-05, 188 P.2d at 307-08 (1948) (court injunction
was modified so as to prohibit defendant from distributing a questionnaire, plaintiff's trade
secret, to plaintiff's customers only; defendant allowed to distribute similar questionnaire to
new customers).
61. Comment e to § 757 merely provided that damages for past harm was one of four
remedies available to the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment e at 10 (1939).
62. Comment e to § 757 indicates that a plaintiff could seek both an injunction and dam-
ages under appropriate circumstances. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. But see
Review of Selected 1984 California Legislation, 16 PAC. L.J. 461, 731 (1985). The journal,
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Compensatory damages were usually awarded, but in some circum-
stances, punitive damages 63 and compensation for lost profits6 were al-
lowed. In very limited circumstances, attorney's fees were granted to the
successful party.65 In making determinations on damages, courts based
their decision on an ad hoc basis, weighing the facts of each case.66 Un-
fortunately, since there were no clear rules available to guide employees
and employers in trade secret disputes, both litigants were left uncertain
as to the exact remedy "appropriate"67 to their particular circumstances.
B. Policy Considerations
At the heart of trade secret disputes in the employer-employee con-
text are two competing policies that pit the employer and employee
against each other. These two policies-the privilege to compete and the
limitations that must be placed on this privilege-are recognized in see-
reviewing the California Act, cited Gordon, 49 Cal. 2d at 695, 321 P.2d at 459, for the proposi-
tion that "damages [were] awarded only when expiration of [an] agreement precluded injunc-
tion." 16 PAc. L.J. at 733 n.23 (1985) (emphasis added). However, a careful reading of
Gordon reveals that damages were awarded because an injunction was inappropriate (time
available for an injunction had elapsed). Had the plaintiff been able to obtain an injunction,
the court's holding would not preclude the plaintiff from also obtaining damages as the journal
suggests. Gordon, 49 Cal. 2d at 695, 321 P.2d at 459.
63. See, e.g., Components, 241 Cal. App. 2d at 730, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (compensatory
and punitive damages awarded against defendant who misappropriated plaintiff's trade
secrets, a customer list and a manufacturing technique for transmitting electrical energy).
64. See, e.g., Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 1972) (applying California
law) (plaintiff entitled to profits as part of damages for trade secret misappropriation); Conti-
nental Car-Na-Var Corp., 24 Cal. 2d at 113, 148 P.2d at 14 (although it is not necessary to
know the exact amount of profits which could have been derived, the court must be certain
that profits would have been derived from the trade secret and that any loss of profits were
clearly the result of the misappropriation; lost profits must not be uncertain or speculative);
Klamath-Orleans Lumber, Inc. v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 458, 151 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1978)
(plaintiff would have been entitled to lost profits from his trade secret had plaintiff requested
an accounting for lost sales). See also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (accounting
for the wrongdoer's profits is one of four remedies allowed under § 757 of the Restatement,
and plaintiff is entitled to more than one remedy).
65. See BROWN & ZELIN, supra note 1, at 146 (comparing Monolith Portland Midwest
Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 267 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Cal. 1966), modified, 407
F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969) (allowing attorney's fees when patent infringement also at issue) and
Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Marina View Heights Dev. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 135
Cal. Rptr. 802 (1977) (granting attorney's fees against third party by a party obligated to take
legal action against defendant through the fault of that party) with Pachmayr Gun Works, Inc.
v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1974) (denying attorney's fees under
California law)). Another commentator has stated that "[u]nder prior [California] law, attor-
neys fees were not recoverable unless a contract between the parties expressly provided that
remedy." Pooley, supra note 4, at 53.
66. See BROWN & ZELIN, supra note I, at 145 ("The potential measure of damages for
misappropriation depends on the facts of each case ...
67. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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tion 757 of the Restatement of Torts as the controlling forces which
shape trade secret regulations.
There are important arguments and concerns advanced by both the
employee and employer in support of their respective positions.68 On one
hand, the Restatement readily acknowledges that the employer and em-
ployee have a privilege to compete with each other, "includ[ing] a privi-
lege to adopt [each other's] business methods, ideas or processes of
manufacture."6 9 This privilege to compete is based on the principle that
society favors free competition and benefits when an employee can freely
transfer ideas and communications from one place of employment to an-
other in order to compete, foster new developments, and improve ex-
isting ideas.70 However, the privilege is not absolute, and the
Restatement heavily emphasizes the limitations necessarily placed on the
privilege to compete. Some limitations, like patent and copyright laws,
aim to promote the "progress of science and the useful arts" by re-
warding protection to the creator for his new idea.71 Others, like trade
secret law, are designed to prevent the improper use of an owner's idea or
information and give the owner protection for what is lawfully his.
72
Hence, the clash becomes evident in the employer-employee scena-
rio when the employer imparts to the employee some type of business
information and the employee later leaves his employment, exercising
his lawful right to change jobs. The degree of control the employer re-
tains over his business information and the impact this control will have
on the employee when he leaves is the primary subject of trade secret
disputes in the employer-employee context. An understanding of the
competing interests, in light of the policy considerations involved, is thus
necessary to grasp the foundation and substance of trade secret law.
1. The employee's perspective
Laws protecting the employee's privilege to compete benefit and
protect both society and the individual employee. Society benefits be-
68. In Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962),
the court stated that trade secret disputes involve "'a businessman['s right] to be protected
against unfair competition stemming from the usurpation of his trade secrets and the right of
an individual to the unhampered pursuit of the occupations and livelihoods for which he is
best suited. There are cogent socio-economic arguments in favor of either position.'" Id. at
286, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (quoting Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 578, 160 A.2d 430, 434
(1960)).
69. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment a at 2 (1939). This privilege to compete is
identified in the first sentence of the comments to § 757. Id.
70. Quittmeyer, supra note 12, at 626-27.
71. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment a at 2 (1939).
72. Id. comment a at 3 & comment b at 7.
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cause the quality and quantity of goods generally improve when competi-
tion increases and restrictive barriers to ideas and information are
removed.73 As a result, society encourages competition and recognizes a
privilege, as identified in the Restatement, for commercial businesses to
adopt each other's methods,74 including those which may or may not be
secret. Additionally, excessive regulations and harsh, stringent controls
protecting trade secrets are disfavored because of monopolies that may
develop if businesses are allowed to hoard secrets and deny others access
to information.75
California courts also recognize the need to protect individual em-
ployees from excessive regulations and restraints that may bind the indi-
vidual's capacity to earn a living.76 The language employed by courts is
stronger than that in the Restatement because courts recognize that the
employee has a right as opposed to aprivilege to compete, as long as the
competition is "fairly and legally conducted. '77 What constitutes "fair
and legal" conduct is debatable. Courts realize that stringent trade secret
protection may prevent an individual who leaves one place of employ-
ment from ever obtaining meaningful employment elsewhere, and are
thus cautious before enforcing such regulations. 7 There are many times
73. For a full discussion of the benefits society obtains from the employer's privilege to
compete, see Quittmeyer, supra note 12, at 626-27.
74. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment a at 2 (1939).
75. New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 30, 161 P. 990, 991 (1916) ("con-
siderations of public policy and justice demand that... protection [of employer's property, i.e.,
trade secrets,] should not be carried to the extent of restricting the earning capacity of individ-
uals on the one side, while tending to create or foster monopolies of industry on the other").
76. See Paraco, Inc. v. Owens, 166 Cal. App. 2d 777, 781, 333 P.2d 360, 363 (1959) (indi-
vidual has property right to pursue any calling, business or profession); Alex Foods, Inc. v.
Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 424, 290 P.2d 646, 652 (1955) (same); see also Continental
Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 110, 148 P.2d 9, 12 (1944) (individual has an
inherent right to follow any common occupation in life that he chooses); New Method Laundry,
174 Cal. at 31, 161 P. at 991 (the right to follow a common occupation is a property right that
must be "zealously" guarded).
77. See Continental Car-Na-Var Corp., 24 Cal. 2d at 110, 148 P.2d at 13 (1944); Alex
Foods, 137 Cal. App. 2d at 424, 290 P.2d at 652 (1955); see also Lloyd Pest Control v. Lopez,
173 Cal. App. 2d 606, 610, 343 P.2d 757, 759 (1959) (where competition is fair, it should be
encouraged).
78. Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198. In Fu-
turecraft Corp., the court referred to an analogous case, Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160
A.2d 430 (1960), involving a research chemist who developed chemical formulas for the plain-
tiff employer. The Wexler court concluded that the formulas were not trade secrets disclosed
to the chemist, but formulas that the chemist developed by himself, through his expertise while
in the pursuit of his duties under the plaintiff. The court in Wexler noted:
This problem becomes particularly significant when one recognizes that [the chem-
ist's] situation is not uncommon. In this era of electronic, chemical, missile and
atomic development, many skilled technicians and expert employees are currently in
the process of developing potential trade secrets.... We must therefore be particu-
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when trade secret protection may be unreasonable and equitable reme-
dies should be denied. For example, there are incidents where an em-
ployee works at a place of employment for a long period of time, and
through his employment, gains particular expertise and skills in a spe-
cialized field. Because his expertise is so limited, to bind this employee
from exercising his skills or knowledge after employment would restrict
his ability to gain similar employment elsewhere and use his special tal-
ents most productively.79 Such a predicament is unfair to the employee.
Every employee is necessarily "possessed of information" gained in one
employment which will help him succeed in his next employment . 0 As
one court stated, "[tihe court cannot compel a man who changes employ-
ers to wipe clean the slate of his memory.""1
This situation is especially acute where an employee already pos-
sesses marketable skills and talents, becomes employed, and exercises his
skills for the benefit of the employer.8 2 In such a case, the employer has
not usually disclosed to the employee any pre-existing trade secrets.8 3
Thus, the question arises whether the "misappropriated" trade secret was
truly the employer's property. Courts should be extremely hesitant
before restricting this type of employee because of the serious conse-
quences involved. In these situations,
"any form of post-employment restraint reduces the economic
mobility of employees and limits their personal freedom to pur-
sue a preferred course of livelihood. The employee's bargaining
position [when seeking future employment] is weakened be-
cause he is potentially shackled by the acquisition of alleged
trade secrets; and thus, paradoxically, he is restrained, because
of his increased expertise, from advancing further in the indus-
larly mindful of any effect our decision in this case might have in disrupting this
pattern of employee mobility, both in view of possible restraints upon an individual
in the pursuit of his livelihood and the harm to the public in general in forestalling to
any extent widespread technological advances.
Futurecraft Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d at 284-85, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (1962) (quoting Wexler v.
Greenburg, 399 Pa. 569, 576, 160 A.2d 430, 433 (1960)) (emphasis ommitted).
79. See infra text accompanying note 85.
80. Matthews Paint Co. v. Seaside Paint Co., 148 Cal. App. 2d 168, 175, 306 P.2d 113, 117
(1957).
81. Futurecraft Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d at 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
82. Id. at 282, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 207. Futurecraft Corp. involved an employee who had been
previously employed in a similar technical field. The court, quoting the trial court, stated that
"'[the employee] carried with him a good deal of knowledge concerning the art, science and
mechanics of valve design and manufacture, and a good deal of skill in the application of that
knowledge... [m]uch, probably most, of that knowledge had been acquired at [the employee's
previous place of employment].'" Id.
83. Id. at 285, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
April 1987) 1185
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1167
try in which he is most productive." 4
... [Under such circumstances, the employee] would be
deprived of the use of knowledge and skill which he gained
which did not originate with [the] plaintiff.
85
As a result, " '[p]rotection should be afforded when, and only when, the
information in question has value.., and where the granting of such
protection will not unduly hamstring the ex-employee in the practice of his
occupation or profession.' "86
2. The employer's perspective
Courts recognize that an employee's ability to compete must be lim-
ited for two reasons-to reward the creator for the ingenuity of his idea
and to punish the party who misappropriates someone else's idea for his
own benefit.17 While trade secret regulation does not specifically aim to
reward the inventor for the development of an idea,8 8 there is no question
that strong protection encourages innovation.89 Often, to develop a trade
secret, the employer will exercise ingenuity and spend a great deal of
time and money researching and developing an idea. In so doing, the
employer takes a risk. Before his idea is transformed into some practical
application, there is no guarantee that the research will pay off or that
the idea will be successful. Once the idea is developed and in continuous
use in the business, the employer can control his idea and limit third
party access to the information through trade secret protection. Thus,
trade secret protection is a reward for developing the idea, a means for
obtaining greater control over the information and greater profits from
the product, and a mechanism to cover the cost of research and develop-
84. Id. at 286, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (quoting Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 579, 160
A.2d 430, 435 (1960)).
85. Id. at 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
86. Id., 23 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (quoting Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47
VA. L. REv. 583, 599 (1961) (emphasis in original)).
87. The court in Futurecraft Corp., for example, recognized that a much greater degree of
confidential business information must necessarily be entrusted to the employee because mod-
em economic growth and development have forced business ventures to expand beyond the
"one-man firm." As a result, employers can no longer keep all their business secrets to them-
selves and are forced to trust them to employees. Id. at 286, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
88. The comments to § 757 of the Restatement clearly indicate that the primary goal of
trade secret protection is to punish the misappropriator for wrongful conduct. RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 757 comment a at 3 & comment b at 7 (1939).
89. For arguments supporting the view that trade secret protection is an incentive for
innovation (versus punishment for wrongful conduct) and a market leverage incentive, see
Quittmeyer, supra note 12, at 626-27; Robison, supra note 7, at 347-49.
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ment. It faithfully rewards the owner for his creative efforts and moti-
vates him to further innovate and develop new ideas.
Strong trade secret regulations, backed by judicial enforcement, de-
ter the wrongful misappropriation of an employer's commercially valua-
ble information. If an employee knows he will be punished for using or
disclosing his employer's secrets, he will be discouraged from acting un-
ethically as a result of coming in contact with a secret during the course
of his employment.
There is a general trend toward enforcing high standards of fairness
and commercial morality in trade secret law.9" Section 757 was specifi-
cally designed to impose liability on the person who misappropriates a
trade secret within the meaning of the Restatement, and California
courts aggressively enforced the Restatement principles. 9 When the em-
ployer has a legitimate trade secret,' the secret is his property, and
"[e]quity will, to the fullest extent, protect the property rights of employ-
ers in their trade secrets."92 In essence, through trade secret protection,
an employer will not only have incentive to innovate but will also obtain
protection for what lawfully belongs to him.
C. Analysis under the Restatement
In arguing a trade secret case in California, an employer had the
burden of proving two elements: (1) a legally protected trade secret, and
(2) a legal basis upon which to predicate relief.93 In simpler terms, under
the Restatement, a court's analysis of a trade secret dispute was two-fold.
Courts first had to determine if a protectable trade secret existed and
second, that a misappropriation of that secret, usually a breach of confi-
dence, occurred.
94
The two requirements were indispensible. Each of the requirements
in the two-part analysis addressed at least one of the two competing
rights and interests previously discussed-the employee's right to en-
hance the skills of his trade through competition and the employer's
90. See Peerless Oakland Laundry v. Hickman, 205 Cal. App. 2d 556, 559, 23 Cal. Rptr.
105, 107 (1962) ("the courts will issue injunctions.., to enforce increasingly high standards of
fairness or commercial morality in trade"); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A.
542 (1980) ("One of the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law is 'the maintenance of
standards of commercial ethics.' ") (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974)). See generally J. SrrroN, supra note 2, at 8-9.
91. See supra note 7.
92. Alex Foods, 137 Cal. App. 2d at 424, 290 P.2d at 652.
93. See Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 283, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198,
207-08 (1962) (citing Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 363, 162 A.2d 370, 374-75
(1960) (quoting Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 577, 160 A.2d 430, 434 (1960))).
94. See supra note 40.
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right to have his commercially valuable interests protected-and guaran-
teed that these competing interests would be balanced when deciding a
trade secret dispute. If the court failed to thoroughly examine each re-
quirement or neglected to consider one or both of them in its analysis,
then the full meaning and intent of section 757, as expressed in the poli-
cies backing the Restatement, was shortchanged. If such a situation oc-
curred and a competing interest was not properly addressed, the court's
analysis was incomplete and either the employer or the employee would
inadvertently be disadvantaged.
Specifically, in determining whether a protectable trade secret ex-
isted, courts had to determine that all the requisite elements of a trade
secret, as identified in the Restatement and supporting case law, were
sufficiently pleaded. In the employer-employee context, this placed upon
the employer the burden of showing that the information in question was
in continuous use in the business95 and afforded him a competitive ad-
vantage over competitors who did not know of it or use it.96 The em-
ployer also had to show that the secret was not easily ascertainable in the
industry97 and demonstrate that he took adequate steps to preserve its
secrecy.98
This proof was important for two reasons. First, it tested the plain-
tiff's claim to relief for aprotectable trade secret. This was critical to the
public policy recognizing the employee's right to compete, because if one
of the elements of a trade secret was missing, then the trade secret was
not a protectable trade secret, and it would be unfair to restrict the em-
ployee's ability to compete and earn a living elsewhere. If an employer
failed to show that his alleged secret was not secret and confidential, for
example, then the employer could not consider the secret his property. 99
According to case law, because the employee has a right to use anything
that was not the employer's property, 100 the employee would not be held
95. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 23 & 29 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 126.
98. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
99. Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 114, 148 P.2d 9, 14 (1944).
100. See California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 203, 188 P.2d
303, 306 (1948) ("An employee has a right, after cessation of employment, to use anything that
is not the property of his employer.").
However, it is vitally important to remember that if a protectable trade secret does exist,
the secret is considered the employer's exclusive property. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (West
1971), which provides that everything an employee acquires by virtue of his employment, ex-
cept compensation, belongs to the employer. For a specific application of § 2860, see Santa
Monica Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Rossier, 42 Cal. App. 2d 467, 470-71, 109 P.2d 382, 383-84
(1941) (trade secrets are protected under § 2860 since they are the employer's property and
cannot be used against the employer). See generally Klamath-Orleans Lumber, Inc. v. Miller,
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liable for using the information in subsequent employment.
The first prong of the analysis also required the court to consider
whether or not the employer performed his correlative duty to affirma-
tively protect his trade secret.1 01 Secrecy is one of the most important
elements of a protectable trade secret. Thus, in order to determine if a
trade secret is a "secret" warranting protection under the Restatement,
one factor that the court will consider is the "extent of measures taken by
[the employer] to guard the secrecy of the information."10 2 Unless "rea-
sonable precautions" to preserve the secrecy of the information are
taken,'0 3 the employer has failed his affirmative duty and liability will not
be imposed. Consequently, if secrecy is not preserved, the trade secret is
not aprotectable interest, and public policy favoring the employee's right
to use the information and compete would override the employer's right
to have his secret protected.
Even if a protectable trade secret existed, the employee may still
have a right to use the information if he did not misappropriate the secret
since trade secret liability is enforceable only when a protectable trade
secret, combined with a misappropriation, exists."° In the employer-em-
ployee context, a misappropriation usually occurred when the employee
breached the implied duty to maintain the confidentiality of any trade
secret entrusted to him.105 Hence, the second part of the analysis, involv-
ing the existence of a misappropriation, is as important as the first for
several reasons.
Like the first requirement, this analysis also placed limits on the em-
ployer's ability to obtain trade secret protection. Relief was not available
87 Cal. App. 3d 458, 465, 151 Cal. Rptr. 118, 121 (1978) ("where, in order to do business the
employer is forced to impart such select information... the information hardly becomes part
of the employees' knowledge which they may freely use at some later time. Rather, it remains
the exclusive property of the employer which must be appropriately protected"); Greenly v.
Cooper, 77 Cal. App. 3d 382, 392, 143 Cal. Rptr. 514, 521 (1978) (plaintiff's customer list,
built up over time and after much work, is plaintiff's property); Futurecraft Corp., 205 Cal.
App. 2d at 283, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 207 (employer has a property right over his trade secrets, but
does not have a monopoly over them); Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 192 Cal. App.
2d 398, 403, 13 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271 (1961) (confidential information acquired by the employer
is the employer's property which courts will protect); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape
Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 164, 329 P.2d 147, 151 (1958) (trade secret is employer's property).
101. For a discussion of the employer's and employee's correlative rights and duties, see
generally Balancing Interests, supra note 8, at 987-92.
102. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b at 6 (1939).
103. Ungar Elea Tools, 192 Cal. App. 2d at 401, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
104. Futurecraft Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d at 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (The employer "may
well have a trade secret yet [the employee may] be privileged to use it by virtue of there being
no covenant or breach of confidence.").
105. See supra note 40.
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unless the employer sufficiently proved that a misappropriation oc-
curred.10 6 Unless the employer showed that the employee wrongfully
used or disclosed the secret, the employee may have a right to use the
information, even at a competing firm. Specifically, for a breach of confi-
dence, the employer had the burden to show that a confidence was actu-
ally imposed on the employee and that the employee had reasonable
notice that the secrets were given in trust.10 7 In keeping with the public
policy motivating section 757 liability, this analysis was important for the
employee. Because a court had to conclude that a breach of confidence
(i.e., misappropriation) actually took place, an employee who had no no-
tice of the trust,' who acquired a trade secret in good faith, 10 9 or who
legally discovered the employer's trade secret"0 would not be liable be-
cause no misappropriation occurred. Since section 757 of the Restate-
ment aims to punish a person for wrongful conduct,"' an employee
cannot be held liable if no wrongful conduct exists.
However, besides protecting the employee, the second prong was
important because it also protected the employer in two ways. First, it
emphasized the seriousness of the employee's duty of confidentiality)
12
While public policy supports the employee's right to compete, courts also
recognize that a breach in the employee's correlative duty of confidential-
ity can severely limit this right. Additionally, the fact that the entire text
of section 757 of the Restatement deals exclusively with defining misap-
propriation,11 3 shows that the employee's duty of confidentiality should
not be taken lightly.
The second part of the analysis was important to the employee be-
cause it gave the employer a legal and enforceable claim to have his trade
secret protected in a court of law if a misappropriation occurred. As
mentioned earlier, the text of section 757 of the Restatement clearly iden-
tifies different types of misappropriations for which a person can be lia-
ble. An employer, applying section 757, could seek remedies against the
employee who misappropriated his secret within the scope of section
106. See, e.g., Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198
(plaintiff was denied relief because he failed to prove that the alleged "secrets" were misappro-
priated by the defendant).
107. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
110. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment a at 4 (1939) (stating that there is no liabil-
ity for proper discovery of a trade secret).
111. See supra note 88.
112. See supra note 101.
113. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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757.114 By having a legal cause of action available, the trade secret
owner can protect what belongs to him and also punish any wrongdoer
who misappropriated his property.
Theoretically, a court's analysis of a trade secret dispute could be
very simple. The court would first see if a protectable trade secret ex-
isted. It would determine whether all the elements of a trade secret were
sufficiently pleaded. It would also make sure that the employer per-
formed his duty and took adequate steps to preserve the secrecy of the
information in question. If the court found that the secret was not a
protectable trade secret, then the court's analysis would end. However, if
the court concluded that a protectable trade secret existed, then the court
would proceed to the second part of the analysis and determine if a mis-
appropriation occurred. 15 The court would consider if the employee
used or disclosed the secret information, pursuant to one of the four
types of misappropriations identified in section 757 of the Restatement.
If the employee did not misappropriate the secret, then the plaintiff-em-
ployer lost and would be denied his requested relief. If there was a mis-
appropriation, however, then the employer won and the analysis was
complete-a protectable trade secret which was misappropriated existed,
and relief could be granted.
In practice, a court's analysis rarely proceeded this smoothly. While
some courts followed the model analysis described above,"1 6 others took
a "cafeteria" approach to trade secret analysis and misapplied section
757, picking and choosing different parts of the Restatement's require-
ments, or emphasizing one party's interest over another.1 7 Other courts
114. Id.
115. Electro-craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897 (Minn. 1983)
("Without a proven trade secret there can be no action for misappropriation, even if defend-
ants' actions were wrongful.").
116. See, eg., American Alloy Steel Corp. v. Ross, 149 Cal. App. 2d 215, 308 P.2d 494
(1957). In American Alloy, the court examined plaintiff's fourth amended complaint and con-
cluded that the plaintiff had failed to allege that the information in question, a customer list,
was not readily accessible to others. The court also found that plaintiff's allegation that the
list was secret and confidential was a "mere conclusion." Id. at 220, 308 P.2d at 497. Because
the complaint did not state sufficient facts to show there was a trade secret, the plaintiff failed
the first requirement, and thus, there was no protectable trade secret. Hence, the court's anal-
ysis was complete, and the court did not have to consider the second requirement, the showing
of a misappropriation.
117. See, eg., Peerless Oakland Laundry Co. v. Hickman, 205 Cal. App. 2d 556, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 105 (1962). In Peerless, the court concluded that the employee breached his employer's
confidence when he solicited the employer's customers for his own business. The court con-
cluded that a breach of confidence existed because the information was confidential and not
readily available to competitors, but failed to explicitly analyze whether the employer took
adequate steps to preserve the information's secrecy or whether he gained a competitive advan-
tage from the list. Although the court would probably have reached the same conclusion had
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almost divorced themselves from the entire analysis and created new cri-
teria for determining trade secret liability.
118
A court should not be faulted, however, for taking an unconven-
tional approach or for circumventing the full intent of the Restatement.
The Restatement encouraged the problem since its principles, which
when applied in their entirety would structure the proper framework for
trade secret analysis, were randomly scattered throughout the text and
the comments in a disorganized fashion.119 It failed to clearly specify
what criteria determined a protectable tiade secret.' 20 Since section 757
and its comments were never codified in statute by any state, courts were
free to deviate from the analysis on an ad hoc basis and select which
parts, if any, they chose to apply. 2' Because the Restatement was not
uniformly applied, there was no guarantee that the employer's and em-
ployee's competing interests would be equally considered and no cer-
tainty that a fair resolution would result.
D. Customer Lists as Trade Secrets
A specific example of a court's problems in defining a trade secret
and determining a misappropriation, while balancing the two competing
interests, arises with customer lists. 122 The list can be the most impor-
tant factor to the economic survival and success of a business. 123 Fre-
quently, both the employer and employee have spent extensive time and
money to build up a customer list.' 24 Unfortunately, as the following
it analyzed the two missing factors, the court should not have assumed this to be necessarily
true.
118. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note I1 and accompanying text.
120. For example, the employer's duty to take reasonable steps to preserve the secrecy of
his trade secret is only one of several factors a court may look to in analyzing a trade secret
case. RFSTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b at 6 (1939). Because it is only a "factor"
which the court may look to, courts differ on whether this duty should be analyzed before
finding a protectable trade secret.
121. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
122. Customer lists are trade secrets. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dempster, 174
Cal. App. 2d 418, 344 P.2d 821 (1959); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b at 5
(1939).
123. See Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d 690, 694, 321 P.2d 456, 459 (1958).
124. For example, the court in Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 130 P. 1180
(1913) stated:
The names of the customers of a business concern whose trade and patronage have
been secured by years of business effort and advertising, and the expenditure of time
and money, constituting a part of the good will of a business which enterprise and
foresight have built up, should be deemed just as sacred and entitled to the same
protection as a secret of compounding some article of manufacture and commerce.
Id. at 102, 130 P. at 1183 (quoting Witkop and Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 61 Misc. 126, 131, 112
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cases demonstrate, courts have not followed a consistent analysis in de-
termining the ownership of customer lists.
Early common law courts granted the employer protection of his
customer list if the list contained peculiar likes and habits of individual
customers or information which, if known, would greatly aid an em-
ployee in competition against the former employer.1 25 Courts reasoned
that these specialized and preferred lists contained information not read-
ily ascertainable to the public 26 and were thus the employer's absolute
property or good will.' 27
In handling trade secret cases dealing with customer lists, many
courts refused to apply the specific criteria for trade secret liability re-
quired by section 757 of the Restatement. An early case, Aetna Building
Maintenance Co. v. West,' 21 for example, set out a five-part test to deter-
mine if the employer had a protectable trade secret. The Aetna court
held that the employer must show that:
(1) The information was confidential and not readily accessible
to competitors; (2) The former employee solicited the custom-
ers of his former employer with intent to injure him; (3) The
former employee sought out certain preferred customers whose
trade is particularly profitable and whose identities are not gen-
erally known to the trade; (4) The business is such that a cus-
tomer will ordinarily patronize only one concern; [and] (5) The
established business relationship between the customer and the
N.Y.S. 874, 878 (1908)). See also Greenly v. Cooper, 77 Cal. App. 3d 382, 392, 143 Cal. Rptr.
514, 521 (1978) (customer list built up over time and effort constituted a trade secret).
125. See Klamath-Orleans Lumber, Inc. v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 458, 465, 151 Cal. Rptr.
118, 121 (1978) (because customers were not easily ascertainable, court concluded that plaintiff
had a preferred and select customer list that added economic value to the business); Santa
Monica Ice and Storage Co. v. Rossier, 42 Cal. App. 2d 467, 469, 109 P.2d 382, 383 (1941)
(customer list was specialized and thus a trade secret; it was obtained through the personal
contacts fostered by the employer and contained information on the customer's habits, cus-
toms and preferences).
126. See Klamath-Orleans, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 464-65, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 521 (court reasoned
that plaintiff's list was not easily ascertainable in the industry because the customers' identities
were not of common knowledge and were obtained only through substantial personal effort);
Greenly, 77 Cal. App. 3d at 392, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 521 (1978) (court held that the customer's
list from plaintiff's loan and brokerage firm, a trade secret, was not readily accessible to the
public because it included "valuable information" such as the areas which a customer would or
would not invest, the maximum amount of investment, and loan expiration dates).
127. Customer lists are the employer's absolute property and part of the employer's busi-
ness good will. See Gordon, 49 Cal. 2d at 694, 321 P.2d at 459 (customer list is an asset to
employer); Empire, 165 Cal. at 99, 130 P. at 1182 (customer list is employer's good will from
the business); Ingrassia v. Bailey, 172 Cal. App. 2d 117,123, 341 P.2d 370, 375 (1959) (customer
list is asset to defendant's business).
128. 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 (1952).
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former employer would normally continue unless interfered
with. 
129
Because of Aetna's strict five-part test, the plaintiff-employer in Aetna
was unable to meet his burden of proving a protectable trade secret and
was subsequently denied relief.'3°
The reaction to Aetna varied. Some courts faithfully applied Aetna's
strict five-part test,13 while others rejected it 132 and applied only parts of
129. Id. at 204-05, 246 P.2d at 15.
130. Id. at 206-07, 246 P.2d at 16-17.
131. See generally Greenly, 77 Cal. App. 3d at 391, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 520; Peerless Oakland
Laundry Co. v. Hickman, 205 Cal. App. 2d 556, 560, 23 Cal. Rptr. 105, 108 (1962); Lloyd Pest
Control v. Lopez, 173 Cal. App. 2d 606, 610-11, 343 P.2d 757, 759-60 (1959); Paraco, Inc. v.
Owens, 166 Cal. App. 2d 777, 782, 333 P.2d 360, 363 (1959).
Other courts recognize a test similar to Aetna's. The court in California Intelligence Bu-
reau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197,188 P.2d 303 (1948), for example, recognized that an
employee should be enjoined from using information gained at his former employer's business
if:
(1) [The former employee is in possession of trade or business secrets or confidential
information, or the like, not readily accessible to others; (2) the former employee
solicits the customers of his former employer in a competing business with intent to
injure his former employer's business; (3) the former employee solicits the customers
of his former employer, who comprise a list of preferred customers whose trade is
profitable to a supplier of a service, knowledge of whom is a trade secret and confi-
dential; (4) one concern is usually patronized by a customer and the lists and names
and addresses of the customers are considered secret and have the character of prop-
erty; (5) there is an established business relationship between the customer and the
former employer which, unless interfered with, normally continues.
Id. at 202, 188 P.2d at 306.
California Intelligence Bureau recognized a separate four-part test, stating that an injunc-
tion should only be issued where:
(1) [The customers solicited (a) do not constitute a trade secret, or confidential infor-
mation, or a confidential list in which a proprietary interest might be claimed, or (b)
are commonly known to the trade and are called upon by salesmen for various com-
panies, or are wholesale buyers whose names appear in directories and are so few in
number that anyone might readily discover them, and the list of them is not secret or
confidential; (2) the former employer is in open competition with others engaged in
similar business, selling in an open, competetive market; (3) the former employee was
a salesman of his former employer in a commercial field where there was no assur-
ance of an order unless he could satisfy his customer that his product was better,
cheaper, or more salable than that of his competitor, where the customer usually
desired to examine, inspect and compare the product and prices offered to him and
each sale was a distinct transaction, not necessarily implying that another will follow;
(4) no secret or trust reposed in the former employee in the course of his employment
is violated and no trade or business secret or confidential information is used by the
former employee.
Id. at 202-03, 188 P.2d at 306.
132. See, e.g., Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th
Cir. 1980) (applying California law) (court took a harsh view of Aetna's five-part test:
"Although in most instances where information will be protectible [sic] as a trade secret all five
of the circumstances described by the court in Aetna will be present, we think California law is
best viewed as not requiring a plaintiff to prove all five to prevail.").
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the test1 33 or resorted back to Restatement principles. In contrast with
the court's view in Aetna, the court in Klamath-Orleans Lumber, Inc. v.
Miller,13 a more recent case, rejected Aetna's rigid test and placed
greater emphasis on the Restatement's requirement of a breach of confi-
dentiality to determine liability. Like the defendant in Aetna, the defend-
ant in Klamath-Orleans left his employer and used his former employer's
customer list for his own benefit. However, the Klamath-Orleans court,
while not overruling Aetna, refused to hold the employer and employee
to Aetna's rigid standards. According to the Klamath-Orleans court, it
was sufficient that there was "substantial evidence to support the trial
court's determination that plaintiffs knowledge was confidential and de-
serving of protection, and that defendants' ability to solicit both more
selectively and more effectively was due to their extensive use of plain-
tiff's customer list-a patent act of unfair competition."' 135 Thus, the
second requirement of the Restatement, a showing of a breach of trust,
and not the determination of a legitimate trade secret, was essential in
Klamath-Orleans.
Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley136 also found
Aetna's test obsolete but on different grounds than Klamath-Orleans.
According to the Hollingsworth court, the "most important consideration
is whether the information [i.e., the customer list] is readily accessible to
a reasonably diligent competitor or salesman."' 37 In Reid v. Mass Co.,
138
the court held that even a public directory was a valuable asset since it
included information, the expiration date of contracts, which was not
readily accessible to competitors. Thus, the public directory, unlike the
customer list in Aetna, was a trade secret that the court would protect
from unauthorized use.
The goal of trade secret law is to prohibit the employee's actual use
or disclosure of the confidential information. 39 Hence, in addition to
proving ownership of the trade secret, the employer must successfully
133. See Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 424-27, 290 P.2d 646, 652-54
(1955). The Alex Foods court specifically considered whether Aetna's requirements should be
read "in the conjunctive and not in the alternative." Id. at 426, 290 P.2d at 653. While the
court did not specifically say that the Aetna test should not be conjunctively applied, this is
implied from the facts and the holding. The court then attempted to apply the facts of the case
to Aetna's test. Even though the plaintiff employer met only four of Aetna's requirements and
could not pass the fifth, the court was still willing to grant the employer relief.
134. 87 Cal. App. 3d 458, 151 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1978).
135. Id. at 466, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (emphasis added).
136. 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying California law).
137. Id. at 1332 (emphasis added). See also supra note 127.
138. 155 Cal. App. 2d 293, 318 P.2d 54 (1957).
139. See supra note 88.
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prove that the employee misappropriated the secret to the employer's
disadvantage.14' The employer can usually prove that the employee's use
of a customer list should be enjoined if he can show that the employee
solicited former customers. Equity bars solicitation, and the Aetna deci-
sion can be rationalized on the grounds that the employee did not solicit
the former customers and thus should not be enjoined from using his
former employer's customer list. In Aetna, the court reasoned that the
defendant's act of informing former customers of change of employment
did not constitute solicitation. 141 Unfortunately, solicitation is not easy
to identify. It still remains unclear where legitimate advertising and busi-
ness practices end and where improper solicitation begins.142 Because no
clear line distinguishes improper personal petition (as in Klamath-Orle-
ans) from merely informing customers of new employment (as in Aetna),
the cases involving customer lists illustrate the importance of balancing
the employer's right to a protectable trade secret against the worker's
right to engage in competitive business. In order to properly balance
these two competing interests, courts must weigh the policies which are
interwoven in the Restatement by carefully examining the unique facts of
the case, the harm done, the ease of acquiring the information, the value
of the list and the extent of the breach of confidence. In general, it ap-
pears that the clearer it is that the trade secret was acquired by the em-
ployee at the employer's place of business and not in the trade generally,
the more likely that courts will find a misappropriated trade secret war-
ranting judicial protection.
III. CALIFORNIA'S ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM
TRADE SECRETS ACT
A. The Plain Language of the California Act
In an attempt to clarify and establish common rules for trade secret
140. See supra note 104.
141. 39 Cal. 2d 198, 204, 246 P.2d 11, 15 (1952).
142. Courts recognize the difficulty of this line drawing process. See Continental Car-Na-
Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 112-13, 148 P.2d 9, 14 (1944) (acknowledging "the
difficulty of drawing the line between methods or acts which may be denounced as conspiracies
to acquire the business or any part of the business of competitors, and those which may be
considered legitimate acts or methods of competition" and "the difficulty in many cases for the
law to determine whether an employee should be permitted to solicit the patrons of his former
employer"); New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 35, 161 P. 990, 993 (1916)
(holding that "'[t]he line which terminates the limits where the rights of the plaintiffs end and
those of the defendants begin is a difficult one to draw' ") (quoting E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
Powder Co. v. Masland, 216 F. 271, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1914)).
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disputes,143 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 1979 and recommended
its enactment in all states. 1" California became the ninth state to adopt
the Uniform Act,145 and its version of the Uniform Act, which went into
effect on January 1, 1985, is found in new California Civil Code sections
3426-3426.10 and California Code of Civil Procedure section 2036.2.146
The California Act is this state's first statute which provides an in-
dependent, civil cause of action specifically for trade secret misappropria-
tion.147 Like the Restatement, the statute is comprehensive. It provides
updated, uniform definitions of terms relating to trade secrets, 148 includ-
ing a definition for trade secrets and misappropriation, 149 and authorizes
injunctions, 150 damages, 15 ' and other relief.1 2 In addition, the statute
mandates trade secret protection during discovery 5 3 and establishes a
143. The Commissioners' Prefatory Note expressed the need for common rules due to the
uneven development in state trade secrets law and the uncertainty of trade secret parameters.
Notwithstanding the commercial importance of state trade secret law to interstate
business, this law has not developed satisfactorily. In the first place, its development
is uneven. Although there typically are a substantial number of reported decisions in
states that are commercial centers, this is not the case in less populous and more
agricultural jurisdictions. Secondly, even in states in which there has been significant
litigation, there is undue uncertainty concerning the parameters of trade secret pro-
tection, and the appropriate remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT commissioners' prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980).
144. Id.
145. See supra note 13.
146. While the basic body of the Uniform Act is contained in §§ 3426-3426.10 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code, the California legislature also enacted § 2036.2 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure as part of the California Act to instruct plaintiffs how to plead a cause of action for trade
secret misappropriation under the new statute.
147. However, California has a criminal statute to govern trade secret misappropriation.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). For a summary of the different ways to
bring a cause of action for trade secret misappropriation in California, see supra note 4.
148. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1985). See also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1980). See infra note 158 for text of these sections.
149. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A.
541-42 (1980). See infra note 174 for text of these sections.
150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2 (West Supp. 1985); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2,
14 U.L.A. 544 (1980). See infra notes 188, 193 & 197 for text of these sections.
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3 (West Supp. 1985); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3,
14 U.L.A. 546 (1980). See infra notes 194 & 201 for text of these sections.
152. Besides injunction and compensatory damages, the California Act authorizes royalties,
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426.2(b) & 3426.3(b), exemplary damages, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(c),
and attorney's fees, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.4 (West Supp. 1985); see also UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980) (royalties); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3b, 14
U.L.A. 546 (1980) (exemplary damages); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4, 14 U.L.A. 548
(attorney's fees) (1980).
153. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.5 (West Supp. 1985); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5,
14 U.L.A. 548 (1980). See infra note 211 for text of these sections.
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single statute of limitations for trade secret violations.15
4
The California Act codifies the common law principles already es-
tablished while providing greater trade secret protection for the em-
ployer. Nonetheless, the employee is not slighted because the Act
indirectly safeguards the employee's right to compete by placing limits
on the employer's ability to control secret information after the employ-
ment relationship is terminated. Thus, like California's common law
under the Restatement, the statute recognizes both the employer's right
to have his trade secret protected and the employee's right to pursue his
professional calling. And like section 757 of the Restatement, a similar
two-prong test exists to balance these competing interests. 155 Under the
California Act, trade secret liability is present only if (1) a protectable
trade secret exists, and (2) there is proof that the secret has been
misappropriated.
However, there are several fundamental differences between the Re-
statement and the California Act. And, although the California Act gen-
erally carries forward the common law test for determining trade secret
liability, the language of the California Act, to the extent that it modifies
or clarifies the common law, must apply. This section dissects the Cali-
fornia Act, focuses on how the California Act and Uniform Act (collec-
tively referred to as "the' Act") differ from section 757 of the
Restatement and highlights the areas of the California Act which signifi-
cantly differ from the Uniform Act.
1. Definitions: Defining a protectable trade secret and determining
misappropriation
a. defining a protectable trade secret
There is a clear consensus that the Act's definition of a protectable
trade secret is broader than the Restatement's' 56 and thus provides much
greater protection to the employer for his commercial information.11
7
Under the Act, three requirements for a trade secret must plainly exist
before a court will grant protection: (1) the secret in question must be
154. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.6 (West Supp. 1985); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 6,
14 U.L.A. 549 (1980).
155. It is important to keep in mind that the purpose of the Uniform Act was to codify
existing trade secret law, not to overrule it. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT commissioners' prefa-
tory note, 14 U.L.A. 538 (1980).
156. See Keene, Senate Daily Journal, Cal. Leg. 1983-84 Reg. Sess., at 13884; Klitzke,
supra note 59, at 284-93 (1980); Pooley, supra note 4, at 51.
157. See Anderson & Martens, Can You Keep a Secret? California's New Trade Secret Stat-
ute Affects Both Businesses and Their Employees, Bus. TO BUs., July 1985, at 41.
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information that (2) derives actual or potential, independent economic
value from its secrecy and (3) has been the subject of reasonable efforts to
maintain the secrecy of that information.158
The first requirement, that the secret in question be information, is
relatively easy to meet. The Act specifically defines trade secrets as "in-
formation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process."1 9 This is similar to the Restatement
which, although neglecting to specifically define trade secrets as "infor-
mation,"'' 60 provided a similar laundry list of examples that commonly
constituted trade secrets.16 However, it is broader in the sense that the
Act construes any information, not merely those in the laundry list, as
potential trade secrets.162 By generically defining trade secrets as "infor-
158. Compare the California Act which states:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) with § 1(4) of the Uniform Act:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 542 0980).
159. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (emphasis added); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACr § 1(4), 14
U.L.A. 542 (1980) (emphasis added). See supra note 158 for text.
160. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 26 for the Restatement's list of potential trade secrets. The following
examples are typical trade secrets listed: formula, pattern (for a machine), device, compilation,
manufacturing process, method, or customer list. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b
at 5 (1939). The Uniform Act includes these examples: formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, techinque, or process. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A.
542 (1980). In comparing the two, it is apparent that the Uniform Act includes all the exam-
ples listed in the Restatement except "customer list." However, courts have interpreted the
Uniform Act's broad definition of "information" to include customer lists. See NCH Corp. v.
Broyles, 551 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1982). Additionally, the Uniform Act specifically in-
cludes techniques and programs as potential trade secrets in its list, but the Restatement does
not. One commentator observed the similarity between the Restatement and the Uniform Act
and concluded:
Although the first Restatement of Torts did not, as noted above, provide a black
letter definition of a trade secret, it did provide a concept which served as a forerun-
ner of the Act's definition .... Thus, while the Restatement did not, even in its
comments, define a trade secret, it did tactily recognize, by its choice of examples,
that a trade secret is information.
Klitzke, supra note 59, at 285.
162. Klitzke, supra note 59, at 288. "[T]he Act has defined the term 'trade secret' by phras-
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mation," the plain language of the Act is purposely not all-inclusive and
avoids the Restatement's problems in having to determine whether a par-
ticular commercial interest, if it were not listed in the laundry list, could
even be considered a trade secret.
163
The second requirement, that the information derive actual or po-
tential economic value" from its secrecy, is the Act's substitution for
the Restatement's "competitive advantage" requirement. 165  However,
the Act is a serious departure from section 757 because of the broad
range of knowledge and information that fits within its scope. While the
Restatement only safeguarded business information that was in "continu-
ous use," 166 the Act abandons this requirement and openly protects those
secrets with potential, as well as actual, economic value. 167 The Act's
authors reasoned that the change was necessary to include negative know
how, that information which research proves would not work, since
knowledge of negative information is just as valuable to a competitor as
an idea that works.1 68 Hence, ideas which the employer has not yet fully
developed or put to use, or single and transitory events of a nonrecurring
nature which are not in "continuous use" would qualify as trade secrets
under the Act.
Additionally, the California Act and the Uniform Act significantly
differ on this second requirement. 169 The California Act disposes of the
ing it in terms of the generic concept of 'information' and thereafter providing contours to the
scope of relief by adding additional requirements." Id.
163. Id.
164. An earlier draft of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act used the words "commercial value"
instead of "economic value." Although there is no explanation for the change in the com-
ments, commercial value is a stricter standard than economic value. While economic value
would include actual and negative information (i.e., information that does not work), commer-
cial value would not include negative information since negative information does not have any
present commercial value. Id. at 288-89.
165. While the Uniform Act does not include the competitive advantage requirement in its
three-part test, the comments in the Uniform Act refer to the competitive advantage at least
twice, indicating that the concept is not obsolete. UNi. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1 & 2 com-
missioners' comments, 14 U.L.A. 543, 546 (1980).
166. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
167. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14
U.L.A. 542 (1980).
168. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AT § I commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 543 (1980).
169. See supra note 158. California has amended the Uniform Act twice. The first, that the
secret derive value from not being "generally known to the public or other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure" differs from the Uniform Act in that the Uniform
Act only requires that the secret be not generally known to "other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure." "Other persons" is an easier standard than the "public"
standard, but there is no significant difference between the Acts since the California Act in-
cludes both standards. According to the comments to the Uniform Act, "other persons"
does not require that information be generally known to the public for trade secret
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Uniform Act's mandate that the information in question derive its in-
dependent economic value from "not being readily ascertainable." Many
trade secrets have stumbled on the "readily ascertainable" require-
ment, 170 and because the authors of the California Act felt there were no
clear guidelines available to determine when a secret was "readily ascer-
tainable," this phrase was amended out of the legislation by the Senate
before final passage of the bill.
17 1
Secrecy is still a key element of a protectable trade secret, and under
the third requirement of the Act, the employer still has a duty to take
affirmative steps to protect his trade secret. 172 Like the Restatement, ab-
solute secrecy is not necessary under the Act. The standard for secrecy is
reasonableness; prohibitively expensive safeguards against "flagrant in-
dustrial espionage" are not necessary. 173 Thus, the Act does not appear
to depart from common law principles concerning secrecy. The Uniform
Act and California Act do not differ on this issue.
b. determining misappropriation
Like the Restatement, even if a protectable trade secret exists, there
is no liability under the Act unless the trade secret has been misappropri-
ated. Although not specified in the same terms as the Restatement,174
rights to be lost. If the principal person who can obtain economic benefit from infor-
mation is aware of it, there is no trade secret. A method of casting metal, for exam-
ple, may be unknown to the general public but readily known within the foundry
industry.
UNiF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1 commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 543 (1980) (emphasis
added). Thus, according to the Uniform Act, if information were not generally known to the
public (a tougher standard) but known to "other persons," i.e., in the industry (an easier stan-
dard), the trade secret protection can be lost. In California, the result of this hypothetical
would be the same. Although California includes the "public" standard, because trade secrets
can be lost if known to "the public" (tougher standard) or "other persons" (easier standard), it
does not matter that it was known to the public (i.e., that it met the tougher standard). Addi-
tionally, if the information failed the easier standard, then it would also fail the tougher stan-
dard. The second amendment to the Uniform Act, the deletion of the "readily ascertainable"
requirement, is significant and is discussed at length in the text accompanying infra notes 170-
71.
170. See supra note 126.
171. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
173. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § I commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 543 (1980).
174. Section 1(2) of the Uniform Act states, in full, that misappropriation occurs if:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent
by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
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the gist of liability under the Act remains the same. According to the
Act, a misappropriation of a trade secret involves the acquisition of infor-
mation through improper means. The Act does not expressly define "im-
proper means," but it states that improper means would include theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or
espionage. 75 In addition, the California Act specifically exempts reverse
engineering from its definition. 176
The Act also specifies different situations where misappropriation
arises. 17 7 Misappropriation occurs when a person 78 knows or should
know that the secret was acquired by improper means 179 or a person who
used improper means to acquire the trade secret discloses the trade secret
without express or implied consent,' 80knew or had reason to know that
(1) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means
to acquire it;
(1H) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know that
it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or
mistake.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 541-42 (1980). See also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3426. 1(b) (California's provision on misappropriation is parallel to the Uniform Act's, except
in contrast to § l(b)(2)(C) of the Uniform Act, the California Act states: "[b]efore a material
change of his or her position"). For a comparison with the Restatement's definition of misap-
propriation, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
175. The Uniform Act states: "'Improper means' includes theft, bribery, misrepresenta-
tion, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through
electronic or other means." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980). In
addition, the comments provide that proper means include:
1. Discovery by independent invention;
2. Discovery by "reverse engineering"...;
3. Discovery under a license from the owner of the trade secret;
4. Observation of the item in public use or on public display;
5. Obtaining the trade secret from published literature.
Id. commissioners' comment at 542.
176. The California Act, in comparison with the Uniform Act states: "'Improper means'
includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to main-
tain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. Reverse engineering or independ-
ent derivation alone shall not be considered improper means." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a)
(emphasis added).
177. See supra note 174.
178. "Person" under the Uniform Act means "a natural person, corporation, business trust,
estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or
agency, or any other legal or commercial entity." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(3), 14
U.L.A. 542 (1980). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 3426.1(c) for California's verbatim definition.
179. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i), 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3426.1(b)(1).
180. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(A), 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3426.l(b)(2)(A).
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his knowledge was a trade secret (based on circumstances which gave rise
to a duty of secrecy), 181 or knew or had reason to know that it was a
trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by mistake
before a material change in his position.
82
In the employer-employee context, the Act still imposes liability
upon an employee who breaches his duty of confidentiality.18 3 However,
the Act differs slightly from the Restatement on this point. Section 757
imposed liability for a breach of confidence that the employer "reposed
in" the employee.1 84 Under the Restatement, the employer had to affirm-
atively give the employee some kind of notice to "repose" in the em-
ployee the confidential nature of the information entrusted. The Act, in
comparison, does not require such affirmative action. Under the Act, the
employer does not have to take responsibility to "repose" a duty of confi-
dence in the employee; instead, the employee's duty arises "under cir-
cumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain [the trade secret's] secrecy
or limit its use."' 185 The comments to the Uniform Act provide no gui-
dance on how to interpret this phrase, and one commentator has sug-
gested that the language will not make any significant changes.1
86
Nevertheless, if a situation arose where the employer failed to "repose"
in the employee, but circumstances indicated that the employee had a
duty to maintain secrecy, the employee would arguably be liable under
the Act but not under the Restatement.
2. Remedies
Unlike the Restatement where the types of relief available were un-
certain,187 the Act identifies the different remedies available, when they
are appropriate, and the extent to which they can be applied. Addition-
ally, unlike the Restatement, the Act authorizes attorney's fees in specific
situations.
The first major remedy, injunctive relief, is significantly broader
181. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(B)(II), (III), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1980); CAL CIV.
CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).
182. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § l(2)(ii)(C), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1980); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3426.1(b)(2)(C).
183. See supra note 37.
184. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
185. UNI. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(2)(ii)(B)(II), 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(ii).
186. "However, the ultimate result may be the same [under the Uniform Act] as it was
under the Restatement since the cases seem to indicate that it is the existence of the confiden-
tial relationship which is important, rather than its manner of creation." Klitzke, supra note
59, at 300.
187. See supra notes 53 and accompanying text & 61 and accompanying text.
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than the Restatement because it applies to both actual and threatened
misappropriation. The Act rejects the basic premise of the Restatement
that liability is imposed only when the misappropriator uses or discloses a
trade secret.1a8 Instead, the Act authorizes injunctive relief for a per-
ceived threat of harm, even though no actual harm has yet occurred.
Thus, under the Act, an employer can legally enjoin an employee who
walks off with a trade secret but has not yet used it.
Additionally, the Act clarifies the scope of injunctive relief available.
While a minority of courts have issued permanent injunctions,1" 9 the Act
mandates that an injunction should only "last for as long as is necessary,
but no longer than is necessary, to eliminate the commercial advantage
or 'lead time' with respect to good faith competitors that a person has
obtained through misappropriation." 9 ' If necessary, the injunction may
be continued for an additional period of time. 191 Hence, while the
wrongful employee will be enjoined from using the trade secret, the dura-
tion of the injunction will be limited to the time necessary to eliminate
any lead time he may have gained over competitors from possession of
the secret; he will not be permanently enjoined.192
Also, under the Act, an injunction may condition further use upon
the payment of a reasonable royalty in cases where it would be "unrea-
sonable" to enjoin the use of the trade secret.' 93 In addition, the Califor-
nia Act authorizes royalties where damages caused by the
misappropriation cannot be proven.194 The payment of royalties is a new
188. Section 2(a) of the Uniform Act provides in full:
(a) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to
the court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist,
but the injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in
order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the
misappropriation.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980) (emphasis added); see also CAL.
CIv. CODE § 3426.2(a) (California deleted the word "reasonable" from its text).
189. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
190. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 2 commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980).
191. See supra note 188.
192. "It would be anti-competitive to continue to restrain [the misappropriator] after any
lead time that [the misappropriator] had derived from misappropriation had been removed."
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 2 commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 545 (1980).
193. Section 2(b) of the Uniform Act states in full: "If the court determines that it would
be unreasonable to prohibit future use, an injunction may condition future use upon payment
of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time the use could have been prohib-
ited." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 2(b), 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3426.2(b) (the California Act follows the Uniform Act verbatim on this provision).
194. Section 3426.3(b) of the California Act provides in full: "If neither damages nor un-
just enrichment caused by misappropriation are provable, the court may order payment of a
reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time the use could have been prohibited."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(b). Note that the Uniform Act has no comparable provision.
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remedy under the Act and is an especially equitable solution to situations
where a misappropriation has occurred, but public policy dictates that it
may be unfair to enjoin the employee. 195 The amount of royalties, how-
ever, cannot be excessive. Like injunctions and damages, they can only
be issued for the period of time that an injunction or damages would
have been appropriate.196
The third remedy, "affirmative acts," is found in section 2(c) of the
Uniform Act.197 Under this remedy, the court can order the defendant
to perform acts that will protect the plaintiff's trade secret. This is a
common law remedy that was available under the Restatement.19
Although section 2(c) authorizes any "affirmative act," 199 like the com-
mon law, it is most likely to be used by an aggrieved plaintiff to recapture
the "fruits of [the] misappropriation.
' '200
The rules governing damages,20 ' the fourth major remedy, are much
clearer than section 757 of the Restatement.20 2 Under the Uniform Act,
a plaintiff can seek damages for actual loss, profits, and any unjust en-
richment to the extent that no double recovery takes place.20" Addition-
ally, where there is "willful and malicious" prosecution, the court has the
195. The comments to the Uniform Act provide that royalties may be more appropriate at
times when there is
an overriding public interest which requires the denial of a prohibitory injunction
against future damaging use and a person's reasonable reliance upon acquisition of a
misappropriated trade secret in good faith and without reason to know of its prior
misappropriation that would be prejudiced by a prohibitory injunction against future
damaging use.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 545 (1980).
196. Id. at 546.
197. Section 2(c) of the Uniform Act provides in full: "In appropriate circumstances, af-
firmative acts to protect a trade secret may be compelled by court order." UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS Ac § 2(c), 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(c) (California's
provision is the same).
198. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
199. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(c), 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3426.2(c) (California's provision is the same).
200. UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 546 (1980).
201. Section 3 of the Uniform Act provides in full:
(a) In addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief, a complainant may recover damages
for the actual loss caused by misappropriation. A complainant also may recover for
the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in
computing damages for actual loss.
(b) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award exem-
plary damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made under subsection
(a).
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3, 14 U.L.A. 546 (1980); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3
(same as Uniform Act except that California Act omits phrase "[i]n addition to or in lieu of
injunctive relief" and adds § 3426.3(b)). See supra note 194 for text of § 3426.3(b).
202. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
203. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3 commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 547 (1980).
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discretion to award exemplary damages up to twice the amount of the
award.204  There are, however, several limitations. Like injunctions,
damages are limited to the period of time when the information would be
entitled to protection and any additional period the misappropriator re-
tains a competitive advantage over other good faith competitors.2" 5 Sec-
ond, if the plaintiff requests damages and an injunction, compensatory
damages will not be awarded during the time the injunction is in effect.
206
Finally, the Act provides clear guidelines that were never specifi-
cally available in section 757 of the Restatement for granting attorney's
fees. 207 Since the purpose of attorney's fees is to deter spurious claims, 20°
courts may order reasonable fees where willful and malicious appropria-
tion exists, a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, or a motion
to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith.2 09 Since attor-
ney's fees must be "reasonable," the comments suggest that an award for
fees should take into account any exemplary damages already
awarded.21 °
3. Additional provisions
The Act provides guidelines in areas where section 757 of the Re-
statement was silent. For example, the Act permits a court to protect
trade secrets during discovery through the use of "reasonable means.
2 1
Under the Act, "reasonable means" includes, but is not limited to, grant-
204. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 3, 14 U.L.A. 546 (1980).
205. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3 commissioners' comment, U.L.A. 547 (1980).
206. Id.
207. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
208. In order to protect parties from frivolous suits and malicious litigation, reasonable
attorney's fees are necessary. As one commentator observed, because trade secret litigation is
extremely expensive and disruptive, it is capable of being used as an anti-competitive, extor-
tionary tool. Pooley, supra note 4, at 53.
209. Section 4 of the Uniform Act provides in full: "If (i) a claim of misappropriation is
made in bad faith, (ii) a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or
(iii) willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4, 14 U.L.A. 548 (1980); see also
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.4 (text is the same).
Also, since the California Act does not appear to conflict with § 128.5 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure, which permits an award of sanctions when a motion is made or
resisted in bad faith, attorney's fees may also be awarded at the preliminary injunctionary
hearing. Pooley, supra note 4, at 53.
210. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4 commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 548 (1980).
211. Section 5 of the Uniform Act provides in full:
In an action under this Act, a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade
secret by reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders in connec-
tion with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of
the action, and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an al-
leged trade secret without prior court approval.
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ing protective orders, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of
the secret and prohibiting the disclosure of the trade secret without prior
court approval.212 The party alleging the misappropriation, however, is
required to identify the trade secret with "reasonable particularity"
before initiating discovery under the California Act.213
Although the Act does not supersede prior statutory or case law
regulating trade secrets, 1 4 the Act imposes a uniform three year statute
of limitations from the time the misappropriation is discovered or should
have been discovered with reasonable diligence. 215 Before, under com-
mon law, the statute of limitations varied, depending upon which legal
basis the action was brought.
Specifically, the California Act applies to all misappropriations oc-
curring after January 1, 1985. If a misappropriation began before this
date and continued into 1985, the California Act applies only to that part
of the misappropriation occurring after January 1, 1985.216
B. Policy Considerations
The California Act is a potentially dangerous weapon against em-
ployees and the rights and privileges they have earned relating to trade
secret law. Applied incorrectly, it can be used to unreasonably restrict
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5, 14 U.L.A. 548 (1980); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.5
(same language except that California Act uses word "title" instead of "Act").
212. See supra note 211.
213. Section 2036.2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides: "In any action
alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act... the
party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable particular-
ity." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2036.2 (West Supp. 1985). There is no comparable provision
in the Uniform Act.
214. Section 3426.7(a) of the California Act provides in full: "Except as otherwise ex-
pressly provided, this title does not supersede any statute relating to misappropriation of a
trade secret, or any statute otherwise regulating trade secrets." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.7(a)
(West Supp. 1985). The Uniform Act does not have a comparable provision.
215. Section 6 of the Uniform Act provides in full: "An action for misappropriation must
be brought within 3 years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reason-
able diligence should have been discovered. For the purposes of this section, a continuing
misappropriation constitutes a single claim." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 6, 14 U.L.A. 549
(1980). See also CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.6 (California's provision is the same).
216. Section 3426.10 of the California Act provides in full:
This title does not apply to misappropriation occurring prior to January 1, 1985. If a
continuing misappropriation otherwise covered by this title began before January 1,
1985, this title does not apply to the part of the misappropriation occurring before
that date. This title does apply to the part of the misappropriation occurring on or
after that date unless the appropriation was not a misappropriation under the law in
effect before the operation of this title.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.10 (West Supp. 1985). The Uniform Act does not have a comparable
provision.
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the employee's mobility and upset the delicate balance existing between
the employer and employee. The Uniform Act was not intended for this
purpose. The primary purpose of the Uniform Act was to codify existing
common law principles and provide a uniform statute to govern trade
secret disputes. Of course, in devising an act that created a cause of ac-
tion for trade secret misappropriation, the authors of the Uniform Act
also gave the employer a legal sword against the employee. However, the
Uniform Act is not one-sided. Although the employer's position in trade
secret disputes was strengthened, the Uniform Act included important
concessions to the employee that strengthened his position as well.
The California Act takes the Uniform Act one step further. On one
hand, it mirrors the Uniform Act enough so that the balance between the
employer and employee's competing interests is still intact. Yet, buried
in the statute's history are several significant changes that were strategi-
cally placed in the California Act and several amendments to the stat-
ute's original bill that were eventually deleted which indicated a bias
toward the employer. Left unchecked, these biases could become strong
enough to destroy the balance based on the original policies behind the
Restatement-the privilege to compete and the limitations on this
privilege.
The idea of a uniform state trade secrets act developed in 1968 when
the American Bar Association considered the possibility of enacting a
"uniform state law to protect against the wrongful disclosure or wrongful
appropriation of trade secrets... maintained in confidence." '217 At that
time, each state developed its own common law to govern trade secrets,
and the idea of a uniform law, applicable to all states, was approached
with caution. The primary concern of the American Bar Association at
that time, in deciding whether or not to draft a uniform act, was the
unresolved policy conflict between the federal patent and copyright laws,
which encouraged public disclosure of ideas, and the developing state
trade secret laws, which encouraged secrecy of commercial ideas, and
any issues on federal preemption of state trade secret laws that might be
raised.2" 8
Later, during the formulation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the
drafters' concern switched from federal preemption to the need for a uni-
form law to control the increasing trade secret litigation mushrooming in
the different jurisdictions. From a national perspective, trade secret law
was not developing satisfactorily.21 9 While trade secret litigation rapidly
217. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACr commissioners' prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 538-39 (1980).
218. Id. at 537-40.
219. Id. at 537-38.
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grew in some states, it hardly grew in others. As a result, the develop-
ment across the nation was uneven--case law was inconsistent and reme-
dies varied. Additionally, during this time, section 757 of the
Restatement, the most commonly applied principle of trade secrets, was
deleted from the Second Restatement of Torts, indicating a greater need
for a new uniform standard.220 All this, combined with the dissatisfac-
tion over patent and copyright laws and the problems with section 757 of
the Restatement, made the Uniform Act ideal.
Unlike the Restatement which was specifically sensitive to the em-
ployer's and employee's competing interests during drafting, the initial
and apparent goal of the Uniform Act was to create a workable trade
secret law that could be readily adopted by all states and minimize the
inconsistencies in state common law.221 However, in drafting a new
trade secret law, especially one with the impact the Uniform Act would
potentially have, the Act inevitably touched on the competing interests
that revolved around the employer-employee context.
1. The employer's perspective
On its face, the Uniform Act appears to broaden trade secret protec-
tion for the employer. This is evident in several provisions in the Act.
First, the definition of a protectable trade secret is broader than in the
Restatement.2 2 Under the Uniform Act, protection is opened to all
types of information including that which is not in continuous use in a
business. Negative information or information not used in years, for ex-
ample, could now be protected under the Uniform Act but could not
under the Restatement. This benefits the employer in several ways. Ob-
viously, the employer's burden of proving a protectable trade secret is
less since commercial interests can easily qualify as "information" under
220. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
221. The Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act provides:
The contribution of the Uniform Act is substitution of unitary definitions of trade
secret and trade secret misappropriation, and a single statute of limitations for the
various property, quasi-contractual, and violation of fiduciary relationship theories of
noncontractual liability utilized at common law. The Uniform Act also codifies the
results of the better reasoned cases concerning the remedies for trade secret
misappropriation.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT commissioners' prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 538 (1980).
The Commissioners' summary was repeated by Assemblyman Elihu Harris, author of
Assembly Bill 501, introducing the Uniform Act in California, in his letter to Governor
George Deukmejian urging the Governor's signature on A.B. 501. Letter from Elihu Harris to
Governor George Deukmejian (Sept. 12, 1984) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
222. For a general discussion on the California Act's definition of a trade secret, see supra
notes 158-73 and accompanying text.
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the Uniform Act. In addition, since more information falls within the
scope of the Uniform Act, the employer benefits because there are greater
restrictions on the types of information an employee can use after em-
ployment. Second, stronger remedies are available to the plaintiff em-
ployer.223 The Uniform Act not only authorizes an injunction for actual
and threatened misappropriation, but also provides royalties, damages
(including profits, unjust enrichment, and exemplary damages up to two
times the award) and attorney's fees under proper circumstances. Thus,
the employer's right to protect his trade secret is greater because of the
wide variety of ways he can recover his property. Last, the employee's
duty of confidentiality remains intact . 2 4 Like the Restatement, the em-
ployer can hold the employee legally liable for a trade secret which is
acquired, used or disclosed through improper means, including a breach
of confidence.
On one hand, the legislative history of the California Act appears
harmless. Assembly Bill 501, introducing the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act in California, passed the Assembly and Senate unanimously without
much controversy.22 5 Additionally, much of the argument in support of
223. For a general discussion on the remedies available under the California Act, see supra
notes 187-210 and accompanying text.
224. For a general discussion on misappropriation under the California Act, see supra notes
174-86 and accompanying text.
225. Assembly Bill 501 passed in the Assembly 76 to 0 on May 5, 1983, and the bill passed
in the Senate 77 to 0 on August 29, 1984. Cal. A.B. 501, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., Assembly Final
History, at 377.
The legislative history of A.B. 501 indicates that the bill went through five versions before
it was approved and adopted by the Governor on September 30, 1984. No drastic changes to
the Uniform Act were made in the California Act, but a few subtle and important differences
should be noted, and the California legislature took the opportunity to refine the Uniform Act
in important areas before the bill's adoption.
The first version of A.B. 501 was an exact copy of the Uniform Act, and it was introduced
by Assemblyman Elihu Harris on February 7, 1983, and referred to the Assembly Committee
on Judiciary on February 15, 1983. See infra note 227 for background on Mr. Harris. Upon
passage, the bill was to apply to misappropriations occurring after January 1, 1984 (the Senate
later amended this date, on July 6, 1984, to January 1, 1985).
The Assembly amended the bill on April 21, 1983, and May 3, 1983, and the Senate later
amended the bill on July 6, 1984, and August 15, 1984.
The Assembly Amendments on April 21, 1983, were as follows:
(a) changed the amount of time an injunction may be continued from a "reasonable
period of time" to a "period of time." See supra note 188 for the text of § 2(a) of the Uniform
Act and § 3426.2(a) of the California Act.
(b) added to the California version of the Uniform Act § 3426.3(b) that a court order
"reasonable" royalties if damages or unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation were
not provable. See supra note 194 for the text of § 3426.3(b) of the California Act. Note,
however, even though the Uniform Act does not contain a parallel provision, the idea of royal-
ties as a remedy is not new to the Uniform Act. Uniform Act § 2(b) and its parallel counter-
part, California Act § 3426.2(b), recognized that royalties could be ordered if it would be
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the bill appears neutral. Most of those arguments merely repeat the same
concern expressed in the Commissioners' prefatory note of a need for a
unreasonable to issue an injunction. See supra note 193 for the text of § 2(b) of the Uniform
Act and § 3426.3(b) of the California Act.
(c) added to the Uniform Act § 3426.7(b) (in this version it was technically added as
§ 3426.8) that the California Act does not affect any contractual rights or remedies currently
available. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.7(b) (West Supp. 1985). See § 7b of the Uniform Act for
the parallel counterpart. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7b, 14 U.L.A. 550 (1980). Note that
§ 3426.8 was permanently amended out of the California Act in the Senate's version on Au-
gust 15, 1984.
(d) added to the Uniform Act § 3426.10 that the California Act would apply to a con-
tinuing misappropriation that occurred before January 1, 1984 (later, in the Senate, this date
was changed to January 1, 1985), but only to the part of the misappropriation occurring on or
after January 1, 1984. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.10 (West Supp. 1985).
(e) added § 2036.2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure which provides that the
party alleging the misappropriation shall "identify the trade secret with particularity" before
discovery begins. See supra note 213 for the text of § 2036.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Note that the July 6, 1984, Senate version of the California Act included an amendment re-
quiring that the trade secret be identified with "reasonable" particularity.
(f) added § 6266 of the Government Code exempting state, local agencies, and their
employees from damages if disclosure of a public record constituted a misappropriation of a
trade secret unless the disclosure was made in bad faith. This section, however, was perma-
nently amended out of the California Act in the Assembly's amended version on May 3, 1983.
The Assembly Amendments on May 3, 1983, were as follows:
(a) amended out § 6266 of the Government Code but added § 3426.7(c) to the Civil
Code providing that the California Act would not affect the disclosure of a public record by a
state or local agency under the California Public Records Act. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.7(c).
After A.B. 501 was read a third time and passed in the Assembly, the bill was sent to the
Senate on May 5, 1983, and referred to the Senate Committee on Judiciary on May 12, 1983.
In the Senate, the bill was amended on July 6, 1984, and August 15, 1984.
The Senate Amendments on July 6, 1984, were as follows:
(a) amended § 3426.4 of the California Act to authorize an award of reasonable attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing party if willful or malicious misappropriation was found. The Sen-
ate's amended version on August 15, 1984, permanently changed willful or malicious back to
willful and malicious, as in the Uniform Act. See supra note 209 for the text of § 3426.4.
(b) amended § 3426.3(c) to increase limits on exemplary damages from two times to
three times the amount of any award for willful or malicious misappropriation. The Senate's
amended version on August 15, 1984, however, permanently changed the limit back to "twice
the amount of award" and changed "willful or malicious" back to "willful and malicious" as
found in the Uniform Act. See supra note 201 for the text of § 3426.3(c).
(c) deemed the Act effective on January 1, 1985 (In this particular version, this provi-
sion was originally § 3426.11. It became § 3426.10 in the August 15, 1984, version when
§ 3426.8 was entirely deleted and some sections of the California Act had to be renumbered).
See supra note 216 for the text of § 3426.10.
(d) changed California Code of Civil Procedure § 2036.2 to include a requirement that
the party alleging the misappropriation identify the trade secret with "reasonable particular-
ity" instead of "particularity." See supra note 213 for the text of § 2036.2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The Senate Amendments on August 15, 1984, were as follows:
(a) amended § 3426. l(d)(1) of the California Act to delete from the definition of "trade
secret" the requirement that the information derive independent economic value from being
"readily ascertainable" from the Uniform Act. See supra note 158 for the text of
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uniform law.226
However, besides uniformity, the California Legislature clearly in-
tended the California Act to provide greater trade secret protection for
the plaintiff employer. Assemblyman Elihu Harris, 227 who introduced
the California Act, urged the Act's adoption due to the growing reliance
on trade secrets, the increasing importance of trade secret law due to
interstate commerce, and the uncertainty of trade secret parameters and
remedies for trade secret misappropriation.228
Several amendments and proposed amendments to Assembly Bill
§ 3426.1(d)(1) of the California Act. Note the Senate kept the requirement that the trade
secret not be generally known to the public. Id.
(b) amended back the requirement of willful and malicious misappropriation for exem-
plary damages and reasonable attorney's fees in §§ 3426.3(c) & 3426.4 of the California Act.
See supra note 201 for the text of § 3426.3(c) & note 209 for the text of § 3426.4.
(c) amended out then § 3426.8 which provided that the California Act does not affect
any contractual rights or remedies.
(d) exempted "reverse engineering" from the definition of improper means in
§ 3426.1(a) of the California Act. See supra note 176 for the text of§ 3426.1(a) of the Califor-
nia Act.
After passage in the Senate on August 27, 1984, the bill was sent back to the Assembly
where the Senate amendments were concurred in on August 29, 1984, by a unanimous vote of
77 to 0. On September 6, 1984, the bill was enrolled and sent to the Governor. It was ap-
proved by Governor George Deukmejian and chaptered by the Secretary of State on Septem-
ber 30, 1984.
Copies of the five versions are available at the Los Angeles County Law Library, Los
Angeles, California.
For a summary of the legislative history of A.B. 501, see Cal. A.B. 501, 1983-84 Reg.
Sess., Assembly Final History, at 377.
For a succinct outline of the July 6, 1984, and August 15, 1984, Senate amendments, see
Concurrence in Senate Amendments, Cal. A.B. 501, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (unpublished docu-
ment by the Assembly Office of Research) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
226. According to the legislative history of A.B. 501, California's purpose in adopting the
Uniform Act was to "assist in bringing clarity and uniformity in this important area of law"
and codify the existing laws governing trade secret misappropriation through the "enactment
of model legislation." See, respectively, Letter from Elihu Harris to Gov. George Deukmejian
(Sept. 12, 1984) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); SENATE COMM. ON JUDI-
ciARY, Cal. A.B. 501, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. 2, SELECTED BILL ANALYSES (1984) (Committee's
analysis of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
227. Assemblyman Elihu Harris (D) 13th District, elected 1978. Chairman, Comm. on
Judiciary; Select Comm. on Fair Employment Practices. Member, Assembly Comm'n on
Criminal Justice; Economic Development & Planning; Labor & Employment; Transportation;
and Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice; Select Comm. on Small Business; Joint Comm'n on Revi-
sion of the Penal Code and Special Legislative Investigating Comm. on the State Bar; Comm'n
on Uniform State Laws; California Judicial Council. CAL. LEGISLATURE AT SACRAMENTO-
BIOGRAPHIES AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY MEMBERS AND OFFICERS
1981-82 Reg. Sess. (1982) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
228. See supra note 1. Assemblyman Harris' arguments, expressing the growing impor-
tance of trade secret protection over patent protection are almost verbatim quotes from the
Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
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501 reflect this second agenda. For example, one of the three require-
ments of a protectable trade secret under the Uniform Act is that the
trade secret derive its economic value from not being "readily ascertain-
able" by proper means. 229 The most serious damage suffered by employ-
ees under the California Act is the deletion of the phrase "readily
ascertainable." This requirement, found in section 1(4)(i) of the Uniform
Act, compelled the court to consider the ease with which the information
in question could be ascertained from sources other than the trade secret.
If the employer made the information available through reference books,
published material, or on the open market, for example, then the infor-
mation was arguably "readily ascertainable" and not a protectable trade
secret. More often, it was unclear at what point information was "read-
ily ascertainable." Where there was uncertainty, this may have meant
that the secrecy of the information was in question and the information
might not be worthy of protection.
Like most legislation, Assembly Bill 501 was the subject of the usual
process of political compromise.230 Specifically, because of the uncer-
229. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1980).
230. Besides the Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section of the State Bar's opposition to
A.B. 501 (discussed in accompanying text), there were two other groups of opponents.
First, the California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) expressed concern that A.B. 501
might be "construed to limit public access to pesticide testing data under the Public Records
Act. That Act exempts, from required disclosure, records which may not be disclosed pursu-
ant to provisions of state law." According to CRLA, "'there is a body of data submitted to
the Department of Food and Agriculture relative to the health and environmental hazards and
efficacy of pesticides that it licenses and regulates. It is crucial that the public have access to
the data so that the public can participate in the Department's regulatory decisions.'" Comm.
on Judiciary, Bill Digest on Cal. A.B. 501, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. 3-4 (April 25, 1983) (quoting the
CRLA) (unpublished document) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). The
CRLA's concerns are appeased in the California Act which includes § 3426.7(c) which states,
in full:
This title does not affect the disclosure of a record by a state or local agency under
the California Public Records Act (Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of
Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code). Any determination as to whether the
disclosure of a record under the California Public Records Act constitutes a misap-
propriation of a trade secret and the rights and remedies with respect thereto shall be
made pursuant to the law in effect before the operative date of this title.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.7(c).
Second, various industries complained that:
[Tihe latter provision [exempting agencies from releasing records which may not be
disclosed pursuant to the provisions of state law] would freeze the evolution of trade
secret law. While all cases of misappropriation not involving the disclosure of public
records would be governed by the law contained in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
in those instances involving the release of official records, the law superseded by the
Act would apply.
SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, Cal. A.B. 501, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. 7-8, SELECTED BILL
ANALYSES (1984) (Committee's analysis on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
This opposition was easily appeased through the enactment of § 3426.7(a) of the California
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tainty of the "readily ascertainable" requirement, the Patent, Trademark
and Copyright Section of the State Bar heavily objected to its inclusion in
the California Act. Due to their efforts, the phrase was removed from
the legislation by the California Senate.23' And, as a result, the trade
secret owner profits because he has one less burden to meet in proving a
protectable trade secret.
Other amendments adopted in the California Act also favor the em-
ployer over the employee. When a court issues a second injunction, for
example, the California Act does not require that the additional period of
time be "reasonable" like the Uniform Act.232
Additionally, there were several Senate amendments which, had
they been adopted, would have strengthened trade secret protection for
the employer. Most noteworthy are the amendments that would have
made the awarding of attorney's fees easier by allowing fees for "willful
or malicious" conduct (versus "willful and malicious" conduct),2 33 and
the amendments that would have increased exemplary damages from two
Act which states in full: "Except as otherwise expressly provided, this title does not supersede
any statute relating to misappropriation of a trade secret, or any statute otherwise regulating
trade secrets." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.7(a).
231. The Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section (PTC) of the State Bar's arguments are
not sound. It is noteworthy that the PTC never complained that the "readily ascertainable"
standard was a bad requirement. Their primary complaint was that it was difficult to deter-
mine when something was readily ascertainable and that this uncertainty would generate much
litigation: "[I]nclusion of the phrase 'readily ascertainable' only muddies the meaning of the
term trade secret.... This opponent believes that making the existence of a trade secret depen-
dent upon the information not being 'readily ascertainable' invites the various parties to specu-
late on the time needed to discover a secret." SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, Cal. A.B. 501,
1983-84 Reg. Sess. 5-6, SELECTED BILL ANALYSES (1984) (Committee's analysis on the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act). It appears that the PTC wanted to decrease excessive argument and
have clear tests that convincingly proved or did not prove a trade secret. However, the "read-
ily ascertainable" standard is a clear standard. Unlike the Restatement, where the criteria to
determine a protectable trade secret was uncertain, the Uniform Act expressly selected this
criteria. Standards are only unclear when one does not know which criteria will determine
whether or not something is a trade secret. The fact that a chosen criteria, e.g., the "readily
ascertainable" requirement, generates argument perhaps indicates its effectiveness. If there are
many arguments, then the trade secret may or may not really be a secret.
Although this is the PTC's primary argument, it should be noted that the PTC also had
two other arguments against the "readily ascertainable" phrase. First, "since the Penal Code
Section 499c definition contains no such requirement, adoption of this formulate would di-
vorce the civil law definition of a trade secret from the criminal law one, thereby generating
unneeded confusion." Id. at 6. Second, they feared that "passage of the bill would endanger
the confidentiality of the trade secrets of firms doing business in California. If companies
doing business in other jurisdiction[s] obtained this information, commerce and jobs could
conceivably flow out of state." Id.
232. Compare UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980) with CAL. CIV.
CODE 3426.2(a) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 188 for the text of §§ 2(a) & 3426.2(a).
233. See supra note 225 (proposed Senate amendment on July 6, 1984).
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times the amount of an award to three times the amount of an award.234
2. The employee's perspective
Although the California Act affords greater protection over trade
secrets to the employer, the public policy supporting the employee's right
to compete has not been totally eradicated. It is important to recognize
that the Act was designed to codify common law, not erase it.235 Thus,
the rights and duties established in common law, including the em-
ployee's right to compete, are still important policy considerations when
analyzing the California Act.
To some degree, in fact, the employee's rights have actually been
strengthened through specific provisions in the California Act. One of
the most important protections to the employee's ability to use informa-
tion obtained during the course of employment, for example, is the duty
of secrecy imposed on the employer. The Act formalizes the employer's
common-law duty to take reasonable efforts to ensure the secrecy of his
information in its definition of a protectable trade secret.236 Unlike the
Restatement where the issue of secrecy was discussed in the comments,
not in the text of section 757, the authors of the Uniform Act apparently
valued this duty enough to expressly include it in the text of the Act.
Thus, no matter how much the information may look like a trade secret
or how valuable the information may be to the employer, unless the em-
ployer fulfilled his duty, the trade secret would not be protected.
Second, the Act authorizes the judge to use discretion when grant-
ing relief.237 Thus, a judge has the ability to control the outcome of the
litigation in light of public policy concerns and fairness to the parties
involved. The Act's specific provisions limiting the scope of injunctions
and providing for injunctions conditioning future use upon the payment
of reasonable royalties,238 for example, indicates that the Act's drafters
were aware of situations where it might be unfair to preclude an em-
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 221 & 226 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 158.
237. See supra note 190 (for example, an injunction may be granted for a longer period of
time if necessary) & note 195 (royalties are discretionary); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3
commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 547 (1980) (exemplary damages are left to the judge's
discretion); Id. § 4 commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 548 (1980) (attorney's fees are
discretionary).
238. See supra note 188 for the text of § 3426.2(a) of California Act (limiting the scope of
the injunction) & note 193 for the text of § 3426.2(b) of the California Act (authorizing
royalties).
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ployee from using the information in question, even if the information
was a protectable trade secret.
Last, California's adoption of Code of Civil Procedure section
2036.2,239 requiring that the party alleging the misappropriation (i.e., the
employer) identify the secret with reasonable particularity before com-
mencing discovery, illustrates that even the California Legislature de-
sired limitations on the employer's right to protect his secret. The words
"reasonable particularity" suggests that the employee is to be protected
from the employer who makes bogus or vague claims. As a result, the'
employer must plead a valid cause of action for trade secret misappropri-
ation before forcing an employee to defend a lawsuit.
C. Analysis under the California Act
As with any new statute, California courts will soon have an oppor-
tunity to apply the California Act and interpret its various provisions.
This is a critical function. In construing the statute, courts will be allo-
cating rights and responsibilities over commercially valuable informa-
tion. If an incorrect analysis is applied against the employer, a court's
decision could strip that employer of prized commercial secrets, possibly
resulting in lost business. On the other extreme, an incorrect analysis
applied against the employee can harm the employee by unreasonably
restricting him from productively using the skills or knowledge of his
trade in a meaningful way. Additionally, society can be hurt. Unreason-
able regulations protecting trade secrets hinder the free transfer of infor-
mation and ideas that make businesses more competitive and productive.
In contrast, if a court fails to apply the Act when it should, protection
under the statute is meaningless. Without protection, the incentive to
develop better methods and products is reduced, since the employer loses
the fruits of his labor.
Since various provisions of the California Act address the compet-
ing interests of both employers and employees, an overly narrow or
overly broad construction of the California Act will upset the balance of
these interests. However, because of the various guidelines available to
the California courts to reach correct decisions, a proper analysis of the
California Act should not be so difficult.
Foremost, in analyzing a trade secret dispute, the court should
strictly follow the plain language of the statute. One of the greatest bene-
fits of the California Act is the simple and direct analysis the statute
provides to determine trade secret liability. Unlike section 757 of the
239. See supra note 213.
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Restatement where one determined liability based on the text of section
757, its comments, and the various statutes and case law, the specific
criteria for determining a protectable trade secret and misappropriation
is explicitly clear in the California Act and should be particularly heeded
by the court.
Second, in construing the statute, courts can also rely on out-of-state
decisions which have already interpreted various parts of the Uniform
Act to the extent that these decisions are applicable and do not contra-
dict the California Legislature's intent behind the California Act. There
is a rich source of decisions available, and these findings can be very
helpful in analyzing the statute. Since the California Act is a uniform
act, such analysis is appropriate and highly recommended. Section
3426.8 of the California Act, in fact, requires that the Act be "applied
and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
with respect to the subject of this title among states enacting it."
'24°
Hence, to ensure the original goal of the Uniform Act, even development
of trade secrets law, an examination of other state's decisions encourages
consistent application of the Uniform Act.
Last, California courts should read the Act in light of public policy,
as expressed in the common law and the legislative history of the statute.
While the Act may contain strict requirements for analyzing a trade se-
cret dispute, it also gives the court great discretion in other areas to apply
equitable principles in light of public policy. For example, a court can
exercise its discretion when authorizing the different remedies available
and the extent to which they should apply. This ability to authorize rem-
edies is a powerful tool for the court, and through its application, the
court can and should adjust the rights and liabilities of the litigating par-
ties to reach a fair decision for both parties involved.
Each of these three guidelines-the plain language of the statute,
out-of-state court decisions, and public policy are important in a court's
analysis. However, since the plain language of the California Act and the
public policies involved have already been discussed, heavier emphasis
will be placed on out-of-state court decisions concerning the Uniform
Act.
Like the Restatement, in an action for trade secret misappropria-
tion, the plaintiff has the burden of both establishing the existence of a
legally protectable trade secret and proving that the trade secret was
wrongfully appropriated under the California Act. Without a protect-
240. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.8 (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added); see also UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 8, 14 U.L.A. 550 (1980) (parallel provision).
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able trade secret, a misappropriation cannot take place, even if the de-
fendant's actions were wrongful.2 a Thus, in every trade secret case
under the California Act, the threshold inquiry is whether the informa-
tion in question is a protectable secret, and courts should begin their
analysis with this issue.
The California Act sets forth three requirements for a protectable
trade secret. Under the Act, the trade secret must be (1) information
that (2) gains potential or actual, independent economic value from not
being generally known and (3) has been the subject of reasonable efforts
to maintain the secrecy of that information.24
1. "Information"
As previously discussed, the plain language of the Act indicates that
"trade secret" is broadly defined under the statute."4 3 This position is in
agreement with out-of-state decisions.2 " Information, as such, has not
been limited to the named items in the Act's definition.
California courts should broadly consider commercial items as "in-
formation." Typical commercial interests not expressly included in the
Act's definition, like customer lists, have already been construed as "in-
formation" within the meaning of the statute,245 and California courts
should not expend great time or energy deciding these points. The court
should consider the terms "information, including . . ." as terms of en-
largement and look beyond the initial examples listed in the Act.
2. "Potential or actual, independent economic value from not being
generally known"
Not all "information" will be protected under the California Act.
Thus, California courts must also consider whether or not the informa-
tion gains actual or potential, independent economic value from not be-
ing generally known. There are several ways in which other courts have
determined if "economic value" exists. First, courts have examined the
information's use (or nonuse) in the business. 246 If the information is
241. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motions, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897 (Minn. 1983).
242. See supra note 158.
243. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
244. American Totalisator Co. v. Autotote Ltd., No. 7268 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 1983)
(LEXIS, Del library, Cases file) (holding that "information" under the Uniform Act should be
broadly construed).
245. NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 551 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1982) (holding that plaintiff's
customer list constituted a trade secret within the definition of the Uniform Act).
246. See supra note 158 (text of § 3426.1(d) of California Act specifically states that infor-
mation with actual or potential value may be protected).
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currently being used in the business, it most likely has economic value.
Or, if the information has potential use in the business, it has economic
value. Second, if the information is worthless, it has no economic value,
even if maintained in the business. An outdated customer list, for exam-
ple, has no value even though it is used by a firm.u47 Third, a court can
consider the monetary value of the information in question. A particular
computer system worth $2,000,000, for example, was determined to be
very valuable to the owner. 48
Additionally, a court should look beyond the "economic value" of
the information and consider the circumstances of the case to determine
whether the information derives its value from being generally unknown.
Again, there are several factors which a court might consider to decide
whether this test is met. First, although the information may be valuable
in one firm, if it is not suitable for a competing firm, it has no economic
value.a49 For example, if the competing firm does not have the machin-
ery, finances, or capability to put the trade secret to use, the trade secret,
for all practical purposes, is worthless to it. Second, the availability of
the information has been used to determine value. For instance, if the
information is a "one-of-a-kind" secret, then that information has value
to its owner from not being generally known u.25  Last, courts still con-
sider whether the owner of the secret has a competitive advantage over
other competitors from owning the trade secret. While the "competitive
advantage" test was a common law requisite and is no longer required
under the Act, many courts still apply that test.2 51
3. Secrecy
As discussed earlier, the standard for secrecy is "reasonableness,"
and courts agree that unduly expensive methods to protect confidential-
ity are not required. 52 While absolute secrecy is not mandatory, a show-
ing of mere intention to keep the information secret is not sufficient;
247. Stephen, Inc. v. Ceccola, No. 7578 (Del. Ch. July 9, 1984) (LEXIS, Del library, Cases
file) (customer list did not have independent value because it was worthless and outdated).
248. Aries Info. Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Mngmt. Sys., 366 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. 1985) (only
plaintiff had the particular computer software which was worth $2 million).
249. American Hoechst Corp. v. Nuodex, Inc., No. 7950 (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 1985) (LEXIS,
Del library, Cases file) (defendant, a photograph film company, could not use plaintiff's "trade
secrets" since the companies produced two different types of film).
250. See supra note 248.
251. American Totalisator Co. v. Autotote Ltd., No. 7268 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 1983)
(LEXIS, Del library, Cases file) (plaintiff's strategic plan was a trade secret and had value
because it contained information not generally known in the industry and gave plaintiff an
advantage over competitors).
252. Technicon Data Sys. v. Curtis 1000, Inc., No. 7644 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1984) (LEXIS,
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affirmative acts are required.253
Unlike section 757 of the Restatement, however, the employer's
duty to take affirmative steps insuring the secrecy of the information is
formally embodied in the California Act. As a result, courts should pay
close attention to the facts of a case to see that the employer fulfills this
duty.
4. Misappropriation
In analyzing the misappropriation of a trade secret, most out-of-
state courts have considered whether or not the trade secret was misap-
propriated. Some courts, when considering this issue, looked specifically
for a breach of confidence to prove misappropriation.254 While most
misappropriations in the employer-employee context involve a breach of
confidence, a misappropriation can also occur where there is no breach of
confidence but the employee has used improper means to acquire the
trade secret. 5 Under the California Act, misappropriation is defined in
terms of "improper means" which includes not only wrongful means but
also a "breach of a duty to maintain secrecy. '2 56 Thus, when California
courts consider whether or not a misappropriation has occurred, they
should apply the specific language of the statute and look for some form
of "improper means," whether or not the means involved a breach of
confidence.
Under the Restatement, a court could pick and choose which crite-
ria to use to determine trade secret liability. In contrast, all three re-
quirements discussed are statutorily required by the California Act.
Since all these requirements must be read conjunctively, a court should
consider each element in its analysis. For example, any time one of the
elements of a protectable trade secret or misappropriation is missing, the
trade secret should not be given protection, and the court's analysis
should immediately end. 57
While some out-of-state courts avoid lengthy discussions regarding
Del library, Cases file) (although additional steps could have been taken, as long as plaintiff's
steps were reasonable, plaintiff fulfilled his duty).
253. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn. 1983).
254. See, e.g., id. at 897 (quoting Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W. 2d
691, 701 (Minn. 1982)) ("We recognize that the confidential relationship is also a prerequisite to
an action for misappropriation.").
255. See supra note 174.
256. See supra note 176.
257. College Life Ins. v. Austin, 466 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. 1984) (since trade secret failed "read-
ily ascertainable" requirement of the Uniform Act, no protectable trade secret was found and
court discontinued its analysis).
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each element required for a protectable trade secret,258 most courts ana-
lyzing the Uniform Act have correctly faulted the plaintiff employer for
conclusory pleading,2 59 incorrect allegations,260 or the failure to allege
one of the three requirements.261  Additionally, most courts should be
applauded for applying the model perfectly.262 However, it is dishearten-
ing that some courts, especially in light of the plain and simple test man-
dated by the Act, have found a protectable trade secret based only on one
or two of the three factors.263 In those cases, the court failed to even
mention the missing factor before reaching its conclusion.
California courts should avoid deficient analysis when applying the
California Act. Incomplete analysis, especially when standards are so
clear, is careless and violates the plain language and legislative intent of
the statute. More important, faulty analysis may lead to unjust results.
For example, it can be especially harmful to the employee if the third
element, the requirement that reasonable efforts are taken to preserve the
secrecy of the information, is neglected in the court's analysis. Even if
the information gained independent economic value from not being gen-
erally known (i.e., the first two requirements), it may still not be the em-
ployer's property unless the employer took reasonable steps to preserve
the secrecy of that information. Thus, the third element is one of the
few, but certainly one of the most important, safeguards of the em-
ployee's right to compete, and a factor in determining who the trade se-
258. See, eg., Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, No. 834-K (Del. Ch. May 8, 1984)
(LEXIS, Del library, Cases file) (court quickly analyzed trade secret definition under Uniform
Act); Tubular Threading v. Scandaliato, 443 So.2d 712 (La. 1983) (court briefly analyzed trade
secret under the Uniform Act definition and concluded that it derived economic value and was
not generally known).
259. See, e.g., Stephen v. Ceccola, No. 7578 (Del. Ch. July 9, 1984) (LEXIS, Del library,
Cases file) (plaintiff did not sufficiently plead cause of action for trade secret misappropriation);
American Hoechst v. Nuodex, Inc., No. 7950 (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 1985) (LEXIS, Del library,
Cases file) (plaintiff's claims of trade secrets were conclusory).
260. See, e.g., Technicon Data Sys. v. Curtis 1000, Inc., No. 7644 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1984)
(LEXIS, Del library, Cases file) (plaintiff incorrectly concluded that the trade secrets were not
readily ascertainable and that he maintained his duty of secrecy); Steenhoven v. College Life
Ins. of America, 458 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. 1984) (plaintiff incorrectly concluded that the customer
list was not readily ascertainable).
261. See, e.g., United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1982) (plaintiff
only alleged facts dealing with the reasonableness of his efforts to maintain secrecy of
information).
262. See, eg., Kozuch v. CRA-MAR Video Center, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. 1985) (court
applied direct analysis from the Uniform Act); Aries Info. Sys. v. Pacific Mngmt. Sys., 366
N.W.2d 366 (Minn. 1985) (same); American Totalisator v. Autotote Ltd., No. 7268 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 18, 1983) (LEXIS, Del library, Cases file) (same).
263. See, e.g., Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, No. 834-K (Del. ch. May 8, 1984)
(LEXIS, Del library, Cases file) (court concluded that trade secret existed without examining if
plaintiff met the third requirement, the duty of secrecy).
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cret really belongs to. If the information in question is not really the
employer's property, then the employee should not be barred from taking
that information and using it in subsequent employment. Unfortunately,
if the court's analysis stopped after the first two requirements and ne-
glected to consider the third, a different result could be reached. Based
solely on the first two requirements, the court could conclude that a pro-
tectable trade secret existed and incorrectly bar the employee from using
the information.
D. Practical Hypothetical
The following is a typical fact pattern involving two potential claims
brought under the California Act.2
Preferred Video Systems is a small electronics company that offers
the public membership in a video club. Members of Preferred's video
club are allowed to purchase video equipment and video tapes at a dis-
counted rate. The company employs approximately five highly moti-
vated sales representatives who work for Preferred on a commission
basis. Since the company's incorporation in 1970, the sales representa-
tives have sold memberships only to people in Los Angeles County. Due
to increased membership and a bright economic outlook, Preferred de-
cided to market its product in the San Diego area. As a result, the com-
pany hired a new sales representative, Dirk Drake, who began working
for Preferred on July 1, 1975, in order to develop a clientele for Preferred
in the San Diego area. Previously, Drake had lived in the San Diego
area, and was involved for ten years in video membership sales similar to
those engaged in by Preferred.
Upon employment, Drake signed a confidential information agree-
ment with Preferred, stating that he would sell Preferred's memberships
in the San Diego area and that he would not, at any time, use or divulge
to others any trade secrets or confidential information furnished during
the course of employment.
During this time of expansion, Preferred also purchased a small, but
expandable, computer with floppy disks from Adding Computer Mart to
keep track of all of its customers. Preferred began compiling, maintain-
ing and periodically updating its customer list on the computer disk.
The disk contained the names and addresses of each Preferred customer
264. This fact pattern is based on the following two cases: Kozuch v. CRA-MAR Video




as well as the history, the size and the quantity of products purchased by
each customer. Proprietary notices appeared on each disk.
Since the computer system was new to Preferred and since it ex-
pected to have new customers from the San Diego area, the Adding sales
representative agreed to update Preferred's system to meet the com-
pany's growing needs.
Although the floppy disks were kept locked in a cabinet, all sales-
men at Preferred were allowed computer printouts of the information to
help them in the sale of Preferred's products. However, each sales per-
son had to obtain permission from the head sales representative before
obtaining a printout. In addition, all computer printouts had the same
proprietary notice that was found on the computer disks.
By March 1985, approximately ten years after starting work with
Preferred, Drake had managed to develop a fairly large clientele for Pre-
ferred in the San Diego area. About this time, Preferred wanted to com-
bine its list of Los Angeles customers with its list of San Diego customers
for a bulk mailing. Since the computer could not perform this function,
Preferred contacted Adding which agreed to update Preferred's system
and develop a program that would interface the Los Angeles and San
Diego customer lists. Adding developed such a program by April 1985,
and returned the disks to Preferred.
It is uncontested that by 1984, Drake became extremely dissatisfied
with his employment with Preferred. In May 1985, after Adding devel-
oped the floppy disk interfacing the Los Angeles and San Diego customer
lists, Drake requested and received an updated version of this list. In
June 1985, the tension between Drake and Preferred climaxed to the
point that Drake terminated his employment with Preferred and immedi-
ately joined Digitec Information Systems, a new electronics company
that had just begun competing with Preferred in the Southern California
area. In July 1985, Drake returned all of Preferred's computer printouts
to Preferred.
It is also uncontested that Digitec bought a computer system and
floppy disks similar to Preferred's from Adding in April 1985, to keep
track of all of its customers, and that Digitec came into possession of
Preferred's disks containing the names of the Los Angeles and San Diego
customers. In July 1985, Digitec sent out a promotional mass mailing to
people listed in a phone directory as well as Preferred's customers in the
Los Angeles and San Diego area.
Preferred sought an injunction to enjoin Digitec from making addi-
tional mailings from their customer list and to enjoin Drake from misap-
propriating confidential information.
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1. Analysis
In determining whether or not to grant Preferred's requested relief,
the Act first requires the court to make a determination that Preferred's
customer list is a trade secret, as defined in the California Act. Pre-
ferred's customer list appears to meet the Act's definition. A customer
list is information, and is economically valuable to Preferred since it
could not have been created by any means other than the efforts of Pre-
ferred's highly motivated sales representatives. In addition, the list was
valuable because it contained information (e.g., the history, size and
quantity of products purchased by each customer) gathered over a fifteen
year period which would be valuable, if known, to Preferred's competi-
tors. Such information would enable a new competitor like Digitec to
solicit new customers and tailor the solicitation to these customers' indi-
vidual needs.
There is also evidence that a protectable trade secret exists because
Preferred took reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the customer
list by locking up the disks containing the lists and placing visible propri-
etary notices on the disks and computer printouts. In addition, the com-
pany has attempted to keep the information secret by limiting its access
to those salesmen who receive prior approval. These efforts are sufficient
under the California Act. Preferred is a small electronics company and,
under the California Act, should not have to provide more protection
than that which is "reasonable under the circumstances."
After concluding that a trade secret exists, the court must next de-
termine if Digitec and Drake misappropriated Preferred's customer list
as defined in the California Act. Digitec would be liable for misappropri-
ating the list under section 3426. l(b)(2)(B)(iii) of the California Act since
it should have known that its acquisition of the list was occasioned by a
third party's (Adding Computer Mart) duty to keep Preferred's list a
secret. Digitec could also be liable under section 3426.1(b)(2)(C) of the
California Act for misappropriating the trade secret. Although Digitec
innocently acquired the list, it should have known that the list belonged
to someone else and thus had a good faith duty not to use the list under
section 3426.1(b)(2)(C).
The court could also conclude that Drake misappropriated a trade
secret under section 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(ii) because Drake breached Pre-
ferred's confidence to maintain the secrecy of the list. Because of the
confidentiality agreement and all of Preferred's efforts to maintain the
secrecy of the list (e.g., the proprietary notices), Drake should have
known that he had a duty to maintain the secrecy of the list. The cus-
tomer list used by Drake was Preferred's property and was regarded by
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Preferred as highly sensitive and valuable. In addition, Drake misappro-
priated the trade secret because he relied on the customer list to solicit
Preferred's customers for Digitec. The facts indicate that the list con-
tained detailed information which was available only in the list. Drake
apparently felt that the list would aid him in his new employment since
he requested an updated copy before leaving Preferred and did not return
the list until one month after starting with Digitec.
Section 3426.2 of the California Act entitles a court to enjoin a mis-
appropriation. However, the court must consider the basic public poli-
cies behind trade secrets law in determining whether or not an injunction
should be issued. It is apparent by the passage of the California Act that
the California Legislature intended to serve the public interest by giving
protection to valuable information that are trade secrets as defined under
the Act. As a result, the public interest would be served if the court
granted an injunction against Digitec from further using Preferred's cus-
tomer list. Under the California Act, Preferred would also be entitled to
any damages it suffered because of Digitec's misappropriation.
However, Preferred would not be allowed to get an injunction
against Drake. Since much of the harm suffered from the misappropria-
tion has already occurred, the threat of harm that an injunction may do
to Drake outweighs the threatened injury to Preferred. Drake has re-
turned the list and will no longer have access to it. Since he is no longer
employed by Preferred, he will not be able to get any more of Preferred's
updated lists. To enjoin Drake at this time from soliciting sales from
customers he cultivated while working for Preferred would effectively
bar him from earning his accustomed living in the area in which he has
worked and lived for years.
Preferred would not be without recourse against Drake. It could
still seek damages suffered from the misappropriation from Drake under
the California Act and any contract remedies available if Drake breached
the confidential information agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts walk a fine line in balancing interests when dealing with
trade secret disputes in the employer-employee context. They must rec-
ognize and respect the employer and employee's legitimate interests and
reconcile the tension in light of the public policies behind the California
Act. Taken together, these competing interests, read in line with the
strict, but clear language of the California Act, set forth the correct
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framework to properly analyze trade secret disputes and dictate an ap-
propriate resolution.
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